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Concepts of organizational boundary have played a long and
integral role configuring the intellectual landscape of organizational
theory.

By and large,

assumed to be there.

organizational-environmental frontiers are simply
The interpenetrated condition of contemporary

organizations and environments,

however, bids us to question theorizing

which treats organizations and environments as ontologically distinct
entities.
In particular,

a new generation of research alliances between a

host of American research universities and multi-national corporations
has provoked debate over the boundaries demarking university and
industrial interests.

Some

(Traditionalists)

fear that the separation

between academic and commercial practices is breaking down,

particularly

as the commercial potential and shrinking developmental timeframes

in

some laboratory-driven fields place a premium on market-oriented
research,
ownership.

entrepreneurship and exclusive claims to information
Others

(Instrumentalists)

v

counter that the academy needs to

update its

internal system of values and priorities if universities are

to effectively meet the needs of a contemporary knowledge-based society.
Accordingly,

this exploratory study attempts to address the

substantivity of organizational boundary by examining how those who
presumably construct frontiers

-

in this case select groups of

university faculty - define the normative boundaries of their academic
work.

Using the oppositional modes characterizing the Traditionalist/

Instrumentalist discourse as conceptual brick and mortar,

faculty were

invited to construct the social relationships of their professional
work.

Thirty-one

(31)

faculty members Q sorted 66 issue statements in a

study designed to give numerical form to their normative boundaries,
order to test
and (2)

(1)

in

the ontological status of organizational boundaries

the claims of the Traditionalist-Instrumentalist antithesis.

The indeterminacy of borders empirically elaborated in this study
opens the literature's core territorial assumptions to interpretation.
If,

in other words,

the

"thingness"

(Weick,

longer be sustained unproblematically,
the management science universe
"organization"

-

to be located?

-

of borders can no

how is the Archimedian point of

the single-minded,

factual

Without firm boundaries,

"outsides" are no longer knowable.
university's"

1977)

"insides" and

The ambiguity surrounding "the

location prompts a reconsideration of interpretive grammar

that promotes organizations as sovereign and unified "centre(s)
calculation and classification"

(Clegg,

vi

1990).

of

The first problem in understanding an organization or a social
system, is its location and identification.
How do we know that we are
dealing with an organization?
What are its boundaries?
What behavior
belongs to the organization, and what behavior lies outside of it?
Daniel Katz and Robert L.

Kahn (1966)

However, this possibility they regard to be a methodological
fiction because, in the face of a multiplicity of occupational world
images, any conception of "society as an autonomous, self-enclosed
system with clear-cut boundaries" is obtainable only by a form of verbal
magic.
Joseph Bensman and Robert Lilienfeld (1991)
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CHAPTER 1

THE CHANGED CONTEXT OF ACADEMIC RESEARCH

Many factors have been involved in the academy's courtship of
industry, but one factor seems overriding.
For the first time in basic
biomedical research, the university has something extremely valuable to
sell.
Culliton (1981)
Introduction
Concepts of organizational boundary have played a long and
integral role configuring the intellectual landscape of organizational
theory.

By and large,

assumed to be there.

organizational-environmental frontiers are simply
The interpenetrated condition of contemporary

organizations and environments, however, bids us to question theorizing
which treats organizations and environments as ontologically distinct
entities

(George and Campbell,

Accordingly,

1990).

this exploratory study attempts to address the issue

of the substantivity of organizational boundary by examining how those
who presumably construct frontiers

-

in this case select groups of

university faculty - define the normative boundaries of their academic
work.1

Using the oppositional modes characterizing what we have

designated here as the Traditionalist/Instrumentalist discourse as
conceptual brick and mortar,

faculty were

invited to construct their own

cartographies regarding the social organization of their professional
relationships.

Our findings provide a mathematical

empirical boundaries at work.

visualization of

These constitute the basis for some

critical questions about the ontological

1

status of

organizational

boundaries and the fundamental organization/environment dualism that
boundaries configure.
This document is divided into six chapters.

Chapter 1 sets the

stage with a brief review of the changing context of university/industry
relations and the debate that has ensued over the alleged reconstruction
of research universities along the lines of the large business
enterprise.

Chapter 2 offers a cartographic analysis of the

organizational literature.

The indicative boundaries or geometry of

seminal theories of organization are used to construct a concentric
model of organizational theory.
approach adopted here,

In conformance with the interpretive

Chapter 3 grounds the current debate over the

materiality of university boundaries in an interpretive history of
university/industry relations.

Chapter 4 explains the operation of Q

Methodology and its significance to this study in preserving the opinion
of our faculty sample.

In Chapter 5,

findings are organized and

interpreted using an array of visual displays.

The conceptual

implications of these findings and interpretations are presented in the
final chapter (6)

along with suggestions for future work.
Background

University,

industry and government relations turned another

corner in the early 1970s.

Universities increasingly looked to industry

to fill the gap created by the overall stabilization of (and in some
cases deep cuts in)

federal research and development (R & D)

imposed by the Nixon administration (NSB,

1982).

funds

For example,

federal

support in 1972 dollars for academic R & D grew at an annual rate of 12%
between 1953 and 1960,
1974 (Rosenzweig,

1982:

14% from 1960 to 1968,
17).

and 0% between 1968 and

At the same time, both government and

2

industry enlisted the university to help unlock the riddle posed by
America's purported "innovation gap"

(Reich,

1989;

Lyon,

1982).

Given

the national mandate to replace an aging industrial base with globally
competitive laboratory-driven technologies,

university research was

reconstituted as a critical economic resource inextricably tied to
national power (Kenny,

1988).

With active government involvement,

these

priorities have inspired an array of novel contractual arrangements
between select research universities and a handful of giant
multinational corporations to commercialize the fruits of academic
research.
The numbers reflect industry's expanding role.

Although

government continues to underwrite the bulk of basic campus research
(not to mention 33% of all in-house industrial R & D in 1985
1985])

[Blits,

industry's absolute and relative importance continues to expand.

For instance,

industrial support of university research doubled in

constant dollars from 1966 to 1978

(Stankiewicz,

1986).

Indeed,

industry's share of total academic R & D funding climbed from 3% in the
late 1970s to roughly $750 million or one-tenth (10%)
research contribution in 1988
Fuchsberg,

1989).2

(Stankiewicz,

1986;

of the federal

Powers,

et al.,

1988;

In the three years between 1981 and 1984 industry

support increased by 8.5% per year (NSB,

1982).

In 1987-88 a milestone

of sorts was achieved with 51% of all industry support going to public
institutions

(particularly Ph.D.-granting research schools),

13.8% of total industry donations in 1956-57

(McMillen,

up from

1989).

In

1987-88 corporations contributed 22.6% of all voluntary support for
higher education - an 82% increase from 1982-83
Education Almanac.

Sept.

6,

1989).

3

(Chronicle of Higher

This trend has been attributed to several key environmental and
institutional factors including:

decisions by university officials to

aggressively seek out business patronage to offset the disruptive impact
of volatile federal funding cycles

(Rosenzweig,

1982;

NSF,

1982);

the

enactment of a range of statutes clearing the way for commercializing
university research (Dickson,

1984;

Reams,

1986;

Kenny,

1988);

the

climate of crisis symbolized by America's yawning trade deficits,
declining productivity,

and the eclipse of long-standing modes of

manufacturing (Dickson,

1984);

the rise of new information-driven

technologies and the spread of science-based industry (OECD,
not least,
hand,

the shrinking gap between university discovery,

and product development,

on the other (Kenny,

1988;

1984);

and,

on the one
Lynton,

1987).

A series of legislative enactments and juridical opinions provided
a major impetus for the commercialization of academic research.
1980,

Congress passed the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act

(Public Law 96-480)
technology centers

opening the way for university-based industrial(Nelkin,

1984).

Shortly thereafter,

the landmark Patent and Trademark Amendments of 1980
517)

In

the passage of

(Public Law 96-

liberalized patent law by awarding universities the right to retain

title to publicly funded research discoveries.

Coverage under this act

was subsequently broadened and additional licensing restrictions were
removed in 1984 under Public Law 98-620.
public monies, henceforth,
private property.

Even if wholly supported by

university research was to be treated as

Granted the right to sell "exclusive licenses on all

discoveries made under a company's sponsorship," the university became a
magnet for foreign and U.S.

investment (Bourke,

1989,

p.

495).

The

effects of this deregulatory legislation were felt almost immediately.

4

"University administrators surveyed by the GAO (Government Accounting
Office)

indicated that Public Law 96-517 had been important in

stimulating business sponsorship of university research, which grew 74
percent,

from $277 million in 1980 to $482 million in 1985"

1988,

23).

p.

Significantly,

legislation to the letter,
patent infringements

the courts have chosen to interpret this

not hesitating to hand down heavy fines for

(Kenny,

Along other fronts,

(Kenny,

1988).

tax laws were amended in 1981 to augment

industry/university information transfers.

Specifically,

the Economic

Recovery Tax Act (Public Law 97-34) enabled corporations to earn tax
credits for research and development through 1986.

P.L.

97-34 was

extended for an additional three years under the 1986 Tax Reform Act.
Legislatures and enforcement agencies have also turned a blind eye
toward the problematic anti-trust issues arising from collaborative
industrial and academic research ventures
see the U.S.

(Dickson,

1984;

Kenny,

1988;

Department of Justice's Antitrust Guide Concerning Research

Joint Ventures.

1980).

Recently,

the National Institutes of Health,

nation's principle source of funding for biomedical research,

the

announced

that it was abandoning proposed conflict-of-interest guidelines
(Gladwell,

1989).

This deregulatory thrust is not predicted to change course anytime
soon.

For one,

the university's fiscal problems continue to mount in

the face of declining state budgets and unfavorable demographic trends
(a shrinking middle class and student-age cohort
the same token,

[Footlick,

1990]).

By

as American managers continue to borrow extravagant sums

of money to retool factories or consolidate corporate empires,
proportionately less capital is available for in-house research activity

5

(Markoff,

1990).

remains intact.

The overriding financial rationale,
Hat in hand,

in other words,

universities add corporate patrons,

while campus research offers industry the most expedient means for
socializing risky research costs

(Dickson,

1984).

The next section and following chapter (2)

are meant to orient the

reader to the characteristic perspectives of organizational boundary
rendered in the Traditionalist,
literatures.

Instrumentalist,

and Management

These discussions supply the basic conceptual material for

the comparative analysis of boundary presented in Chapters 4 and 5.

The Debate:

The University - An Economic or Non-Economic Institution?

The past two decades have witnessed the advent of a new commercial
compact between big business and the cream of American research
universities.

Increasingly,

traditional philanthropic arrangements are

being replaced by a preference for multi-year business partnerships and
consortia often involving tens of millions of dollars.
reasons specified earlier,

For the host of

university administrators and faculty find

themselves under mounting pressure to commodify the fruits of research
(Schaffer,

1980).

The reputed emphasis on the entrepreneurization of

the research process along with the marketization and privatization of
research discovery has rekindled debate over the purpose and conduct of
the university's intellectual culture.
Proponents for the "greater instrumentalism" of university
research agendas and processes,

for example, view research institutions

as an underutilized national resource.

Lynton and Elman (1987)

are

representative when they write that,
The existing, narrowly defined mold into which almost all
universities have tried to cast themselves is not adequate to
the expanding needs of our contemporary, knowledge-based

6

society.
A large number of institutions are failing to
realize their full potential because their internal system of
values, priorities, and aspirations primarily emphasizes and
rewards traditional modes of teaching for which the clientele
is shrinking and basic research for which most of these
institutions cannot receive adequate support (12).
Historical and logical necessity,

it is argued, have created an

imperative need to do for industry what the land-grant system
accomplished for American agriculture.3

New commercial breakthroughs,

particularly in fast-breaking sciences like microelectronics and
biotechnology, have obscured the line separating basic and developmental
research activity.

Ready or not,

the ascendancy of science-driven

technologies has ushered in a new interdisciplinary era necessitating a
pragmatic reworking of industry/university boundaries.
Perhaps most importantly,

the reputed reduction in the time

required to develop new product applications in some fields has involved
capital in virtually every phase of the university's discovery process.
Dorothy Nelkin (1984)

observes that,

In the past, commercial interests looked primarily to the
goods and services produced through applied research; today,
more fundamental knowledge is also recognized as having
intrinsic value

(2).

These developments overturn the popular idea of the university campus as
a world apart.

In sum,

the "Instrumental" school avows,

the vestigial

cultural remnants of the 19th Century university must not be allowed to
cramp the contemporary campus's
modernization.

(and the nation's) march toward

Times have changed.

Economic and military

reconstruction sanctions the invention of more fluid institutional
arrangements between industry,

the university and the state to market

the technology emerging from university laboratory discovery.

7

But a handful of less sanguine observers insist on examining the
fine print.

Suspecting a variant of Gresham's Law at work,

they foresee

the day when market-oriented behavior drives out the academy's
collective operating norms.

That is,

the "Traditionalist" fears that as

more academics adopt an entrepreneurial model of success,

the deepening

business/university interface that results will produce unintended and
undesirable institutional consequences for the university and society at
large

(Noble & Pfund,

Rule,

1988; Werth,

1980;

Schaffer,

1980; Nelkin,

1984;

Dickson,

1984;

1988).4

These concerns appear to derive from the assumption that the
university and industry are each grounded in two essentially
antithetical hierarchies of values:
exchange ethic where competition,
norm;

one

(industry) based on a market

private ownership and secrecy are the

the other (the university) on a property-less ethos where

information (and the research and teaching function)

is validated

through determinations of social utility and the act of sharing
(Gouldner,

1970;

Price,

1986).

Are policies intended to facilitate

business and university collaboration,

Traditionalists ask,

in fact

undermining the very existence of the university as a cooperative
institution of liberal learning?
feel,

These contradictory tendencies,

they

need to be acknowledged and openly explored.
In sum,

that the Traditionalist/Instrumentalist discourse exists

suggests that established norms and patterns of work peculiar to the
academic community in the United States have undergone substantive
modification as universities have moved from an adjunct role as
providers of scientific knowledge and personnel to the intersection of
national economic development (Smith,

8

1974;

Etzkowitz,

1989).

The

upshot appears to be that the traditional divisions of labor
differentiating the ethos of science and commerce,
tight,

are today more obscured than ever before.

although never air¬
The entrepreneurial

inclinations of a growing number of leading academic scientists and
university administrators make it increasingly difficult to obtain an
accurate fix on where the university begins and industry ends.

Business

and government have become so deeply entrenched in some specialized
areas of academic research that conventional definitions of
organizational integrity based on precise delineations between "inside"
and "outside"

(and public and private) no longer seem to apply.

All of

this has culminated in a new awareness of boundary.
The controversy surrounding the University of Utah's cold-fusion
experiments in the Spring of 1989 may serve to illustrate the point
(McDonald,

1989;

Blakeslee,

1989;

Fuchsberg,

by many scientists at the time was,

1989).

The question asked

did the management of the Pons-

Fleischmann cold-fusion experiment represent a normative aberration or a
symptom of larger institutional changes?

On one level -

the issue was one of methodological competence.
to the established pragmatics of chemistry?

Did the research adhere

Was,

water used to bathe the experiment evenly mixed?
calibrated correctly?

On another level -

that of craft -

for example,

the heavy

Were instruments

the institutional -

the foot-

dragging release of vital experimental details frustrated the peer
review process thus inviting widespread doubts
integrity of the scientists themselves
Noble,

1989;

Browne,

1989).

(even ridicule)

(McDonald,

1989;

over the

Raymond,

1989;

Apparently eager to establish a claim for

intellectual priority and ownership, but at the same time keenly aware
of the lucrative prospects for commercializing the results of their

9

work,

did Drs.

Pons and Fleischmann (egged on by university officials)

behave more like scientists or businessmen?
The same kind of question is being asked about elite research
universities as a class
1984;

Krimsky,

1987).

(Noble & Pfund,

1980; Nelkin,

1984;

What "business" are universities in?

powerful mutual attraction drawing university officials,
scientists,

Dickson,

and representatives of industry together,

The

leading

and the tacit

redrawing of institutional borders that this allegedly entails,

not only

strains the integrity of organizational frontiers but the literature's
foundational analytic categories as well
words,

(Etzkowitz,

1989).5

In other

the documented intimacy of universities and industry presents a

special opportunity to reevaluate the adequacy of the unquestioned
ontological status of organizational boundary,

organizations,

and

environments shaping the literature's intellectual landscape.

Endnotes
1.

"Substantivity" is Stewart Clegg's (1990) term.
Clegg uses it to
describe realist conceptions of organization bounded by fixed,
material frontiers.
Likewise, substantivity is used here to
denote objectively discernible "thingness."

2.

These figures actually understate industry's role because its
support flows through a variety of direct and indirect channels,
i.e., grants, private donations, foundations, hiring faculty, etc.
(Zinberg, 1985), clearing the way for commercializing university
research.

3.

"The extension of public support for many sciences in the
nineteenth century was premised upon their capacity to reduce
uncertainty in key areas, such as agriculture" (Whitley, 1984:
140).

4. For example, after signing a ten-year, $23 million pact with the
Monsanto Corporation in 1974, Harvard "...discarded its
traditional patent policy that 'no patents primarily concerned
with therapeutics or public health may be taken out...except for
dedication to the public'" (Reams, 1986: 105).
In addition,
"During the almost two-year period of negotiations between the

10

parties,

the standard practice of peer review through faculty

committees and public comment was avoided"
Such flexibility is not unusual

5.

(Reams,

(see Dickson,

Henry Etzkowitz

that incentives

from two sources.

writes

"Shifts

105).

in the current climate of

university/industry relations
(1989)

1986:

1984;

Reams,

for change arise

in federal funding patterns

academic research and federal policy changes

1986).

for

regarding the

ownership of intellectual property define the external context for
these changes.

The

internal context is

and faculty reactions

to these changes and to entrepreneurial

activities at similar institutions"
detail,

found in administrative

consult Chapter 3.

11

(15).

For more historical

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In the absence of distinguishable boundaries,
organizations as we understand the term.

there can be no

Scott,

1987

Introduction
The ambiguity produced by the simultaneous forward integration of
university science into the marketplace and deep backward integration of
capital into the academic discovery process poses a dilemma for any
theoretical system that treats organizations and environments as
distinct entities, because it confounds the objective ontological status
of organizational boundaries.

In large part the materiality of

organizational boundary underwriting the organization/environment
duality parallels the theoretical metamorphosis of organizational
constructs in the literature.

That is, hand in hand with more

contingent imagery of "organization," concepts of boundary have evolved
from fixed concrete entities to something more provisional and
processual.

Still, however boundary is conceptualized or problematized,

its critical bracketing function of differentiating organizations from
environments continues to unify the literature.
A theoretical emphasis on boundary,

then, makes it possible to

analyze the literature's major contributors and schools according to the
lines peculiar to each.

Indeed,

as this chapter will attempt to show,

the degree of "facticity" that various theorists inject into
"organizational boundaries" reveals much about the evolution of
organizational theory's ontological presuppositions concerning
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institutional order and change
below adheres to Scott's

(Hall,

1981).

For convenience,

the essay

(1987) paradigmatic classification of the

theoretical literature into rationalistic,

natural,

and open systems.

The Rational Prototype
Thick, bold lines drawn at military angles are the hallmark of
goal-driven,

rationalistic models of organization (Gulick & Urwick,

1937; Mooney & Riley,
Weber,

1946).

1939;

Fayol,

1949;

Frederick Taylor,

1911; Max

The expeditious achievement of managerial objectives

(functional rationality)

dictated that structural boundaries be made

mathematically explicit and visible

(Scott,

1987).

Fixed boundaries in

the guise of formalized roles, procedures and rules underwrote
management's master plan,

insured workplace compliance,

and isolated the

organization's core rationality from potentially destabilizing extraorganizational forces.
Certainty was encapsulated within a jurisdictional vocabulary functionalization,

specialization,

standardization,

and specification -

delineating a highly formalized set of interdependent functional
relationships.
Gulick

6c

Urwick,

The early Classical Management theorists

1937;

Mooney

6c

Riley,

1939;

Fayol,

(Taylor,

1949),

1911;

for example,

constructed their clockwork model of organization around an unquestioned
adherence to designated chains and spans of control.

(1911)

"scientific"

formula to standardize work specified the longitude

and latitude of formal organization labor.

And Weber's

Frederick Taylor's

(1946)

ideal of rational-legal authority entailed a

juridical hierarchy of roles.
"technical instruments"

the division and coordination of

Organizations were first and last

(Selznick,

1957),

13

where the worker

["an irritant

that must be controlled"]

(Astley & Van de Ven,

mechanical order of technical requirements.
and utilitarian)

1983)] was "fitted" to a

Driven by "a (maximizing

logic of cost and efficiency" organizational

administration constituted an exercise in social engineering
(Roethlisberger & Dickson,
Boundaries, however,

1939).
need not always be so sharply drawn.

It

occurred to some that efficiency might be enhanced if structural
boundaries were made less conspicuous.

Control,

that is,

rendered less obtrusive and ultimately less conflictual,

could be
if the premises

of decisions were encoded in organizational structure itself (Simon,
1947;

Perrow,

1979;

Edwards,

1979).

In this way,

individual rationality

is "bounded" within a skein of means-ends chains of management
algorithms.

Self-interest,

irrationalities)

idiosyncracy and novelty (i.e.,

are bracketed by the attention-directing structure

embedded in organizational routine,
communication (Simon,

1947).

language and official channels of

In short,

prescribed behavior is subtly

packaged in a cybernetic pyramid of Skinnerian boxes.

The foreman was

made superfluous after organizational control came to mean applying the
right structure.

In deciding on the limits of self-determination,

management's principal task was to get its lines right.
In sum,

the conceptual closure

(Thompson,

1967)

assumed by closed

rational models of organization takes the objective integrity of
boundaries for granted.

Boundaries shelter an aseptic,

space - a management laboratory where,
variables,
exists

variable.

except for a limited set of

all others are controlled for.

(encapsulated)

on its

frictionless

(management's)

The organization as such
own terms,

an independent

As the formal embodiment of management's expectations the
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closed rational paradigm has come to represent the literature's
unrequited anatomical ideal,

one strongly imprinting the ontological

contours of subsequent work.
Interestingly,

closed systems have not only served as the

literature's analytical prototype, but the touchstone of conceptual
tensions as well.

That is,

closed systems in any pure sense were

destined to be short-lived, because the extraordinary levels of
formalization prescribed simply required too many lines.

The

circumscribed autonomy prescribed by such models virtually begged for
modification if efficiencies were to be achieved.
analysis,

In the final

systems specifically designed to drive out efficiency-sapping

contradictions like conflict and low morale succeeded in fostering the
opposite,

sending theorists and managers back to the proverbial drawing

board.

The Natural Systems Tradition
Objectified notions of organizational boundary softened somewhat
after Roethlisberger and Dickson (1939)

stumbled across the factory

Gemeinschaft.

Management to be sure still choreographed the formal

organization.

However,

the discovery of work quotas,

informal status

hierarchies and leadership patterns indicated that overall
organizational design could no longer be realistically claimed an
exclusive management prerogative.
drawing lines too

Alienated workers proved adept at

(Burrell & Morgan,

1979).

Management,

it appeared,

had lost the last word in defining task borders after workers were found
to be busy interpreting them.
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The interest in informal and small group processes spawned by the
Hawthorne studies
1951;

Sayles,

(Maier,

1958;

1952;

Roy,

1952;

Katz et al.f
Seashore,

1950;

1954)

Homans,

1950; Whyte,

suggested that management

did not impose boundaries so much as initiate them (Barnard,
other words,

1938).

In

the concept of "social man" flirted with the radical

possibility that structural boundaries were negotiable and corrigible
and that rationality was only one goal among many.
Concerned by the shopfloor backlash occasionally ignited by more
overt and coercive forms of control, human relations pioneers campaigned
to eliminate boundaries
(Barnard,

1938; Mayo,

(and organizational politics)

1945).

altogether

The costly apartheid dividing labor and

management conflicted with the institution of a classless "condition of
(moral)

communion"

(Barnard,

1938).

Perhaps if the right incentives

were implemented cultural authority might replace coercive authority.
Boundaries might then be interiorized.

Even distinctions between the

informal and formal organization might be erased,

"formal organizations

arise out of and are necessary to informal organization; but when formal
organizations come into operation,
organizations"

they create and require informal

(Barnard,

1968:

120).1

Excepting Barnard,

then,

and the work of Selznick (1948)

Parsons

(1960),

inward-looking.2

the Natural Model remained essentially contextless and
However,

the fact that organizational models were now

inhabited - no longer lifeless
Specifically,

and

-

impacted thinking about boundary.

the presence of the informal organization admitted the

possibility for tension between autonomy and imposed structure thereby
creating theoretical space for interpretation,
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negotiation and change.

Open Systems
The installation of the environment as the source of theoretical
order signified the end of the literature's Ptolemaic legacy.
a self-sufficient,
effect,

self-constituted entity,

decentered,

the organization is,

in

reduced to a constituent part of a larger and more

powerful constellation of organizations and constituencies
1966).

No longer

(Katz & Kahn,

Within this new Copernican schema the environment sets varied

adaptive tasks leaving managers little choice but to respond in some
appropriate manner if the organization is to survive.

Moreover,

recognition of environmental whimsy introduces new requirements for
structural flexibility complicating management's line-drawing functions.
The combined "morphogenetic" needs of the organization and the
environment (Buckley,

1967)

internal and external,

transforms organizational boundaries, both

into improvisations.

As concepts of boundary

shed their static qualities, boundary maintenance develops into a
management priority.

The quixotic chase after the one best way to

organize is finally laid to rest (Burns & Stalker,
If environment acts and organizations react,
design (boundary-setting)

is never complete

1961).
then,

organization

(Lawrence & Lorsch,

1967).

"Social organizations, more variable and loosely coupled than biological
systems,

can and do fundamentally change their structural character¬

istics over time"

(Scott,

1987:

83).

At times,

the environment may

wreak havoc with organizational topography (Hannan & Freeman,
Aldrich & Pfeffer,

1976), but management,

sectors of the economy,

1977;

particularly in oligopolistic

is not without options.

For example,

vulnerability can be reduced by appropriating environmental uncertainty
(Williamson,

1975),

or with a modicum of self-insight,
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enacting a more

manageable environment (Weick,

1979;

Smircich & Stubbart,

1985).

Or,

managers can engage in proactive policies by striking bargains with
their respective environments.
Scott,

1962;

Salancik,

Emery & Trist,

1978)

(Thompson,

1967;

For instance,

1965),

network models

(Blau &

resource dependency models

(Pfeffer &

and a host of buffering and scanning strategies
Galbraith,

1977) enable managers to effect an

organizational/environmental accommodation.
No doubt,

the notions of environmental contingency and change made

organizational design more difficult.

Indeed,

the new levels of

uncertainty introduced by environmentally-induced contingencies
underscored the need for concise boundaries.

If the organization was to

remain the central unit of analysis and seat of control,

then its core

rationality had to be insulated from environmental contingency and
surprise.

The definition of organizational boundary may have been

revamped with the advent of the Open System perspective, but the need
for boundary had not.

Discussion:

Recasting Boundary

One's first impulse in the wake of this discussion is to conclude
that concepts of organizational boundary have mellowed synthetic with age,

turned more

particularly as theoretical models have grown more

sociological in content and scope.

However,

closer inspection suggests

that boundary-setting has not lost any of its original appeal.

Granted,

contemporary concepts of boundaries resemble semi-permeable membranes.
But the literature's familiar ontological landmarks have endured because
its basic text remains secure Perrow;

1979;

Scott,

1987;

the will to control

Ferguson,
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1984).

(Edwards,

1979;

As a consequence, many

time-honored conceptual dichotomies have not been modified in any
substantive way at all - particularly the pivotal binary polarity
segregating insides

(organizations)

Without question,

and outsides

(environments).

the relative complexities of the Natural and

Open paradigms have interjected more contingency and uncertainty into
the literature.

Nonetheless,

operates undiminished.

the desire for a predictable order

Implicitly, both the Natural and Open metaphors

covet the metric sovereignty of the Rational prototype.

The specialized

structure of authority embodied in each of these germinal paradigms
still turns on the coordinating oversight of a systems-designer.
in its way privileges supervision.
speak to things "as they are"

That is,

(de Man,

1979).

Each

each centers management to
The control over the

construction of boundary (and denomination) underwrites the literature's
longstanding policy of containment - everything in its proper place
(Zeitz,

1980).

Complexing Organizational Boundary
The Rational,

Natural and Open paradigms not only share common

boundaries, but all take the integrity of organizational/environmental
frontiers for granted.

For each of these structuralist templates

precise boundaries are essential for delineating domains of function and
control vital to the generic problem of order embodied in functionalist
ontology (Burrell and Morgan,

1979).

Perhaps Open Systems theory's

fascination with organizational design constituted the high water mark
for positioning organizational boundaries
1967).
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(Katz & Kahn,

1961;

Thompson,

The subsequent advent of Contingency Theory in the late 1960s and
early 1970s, however,

made locating organizational boundaries a more

daunting analytical task.

For one,

Contingency theory's preeminent

interest in documenting proper "fits" between context and organizational
design required a new level of organizational adaptability (Gresov,
1989).

Second,

the literature's emphasis on environmental uncertainty

(and corollary departure from norms of rationality)
analytical lines even more
1977; Weick,

1976).

(March & Simon,

Third,

1958;

tended to obscure

Cohen, March & Olsen,

the sophistication of Contingency models -

the addition of elusive concepts such as technology,
linkages,
problems
Perrow,

power,

and lateral

for example - only exacerbated definitional and operational
(Woodward,

1968;

1965;

Lawrence & Lorsch,

Hage & Aiken,

Dachler & Wilpert,

1978;

1969;

Pfeffer,

1967;

Pugh et al.,
1981),

Thompson,

1969;

1967;

Galbraith,

1973;

since situating analytic

boundaries is virtually impossible if conceptual elements cannot be
elucidated with adequate precision (Venkatraman & Prescott,
Last, but not least,

1990).

recognition of isomorphic contexts and

interdependencies problematized the criteria used to differentiate
"insides" from "outsides"
Powell,

(Meyer & Rowan,

1983; Astley & Van de Ven,

1983).

1977;

Zucker,

1983;

Dimaggio &

Scott (1987) neatly captures

the ontological problematic that these contingencies pose,

"The nested

nature of organizational environments as well as the penetration of
organizations by their environments raises serious problems for
investigators who are trying to decide where to draw boundaries for
analytic purposes"

(139).

Each of these conditions places the identification and measurement
of boundary in doubt.

In their own way Contingency theorists
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problematize the ontological status of boundary in their determined
efforts to pin it down.

Nevertheless,

no one steps forward to grapple

with the paradigmatic contradictions that these complex models present.
Although conceptual boundary has become as porous as the MexicanAmerican border, by and large the organizational literature continues to
treat organizational boundary as a concrete "thing."
environment compels tactical realignments.

On occasion,

the

But in the end, boundaries

are known - something you can put your finger on.

Despite the

interpenetration of organizations and environments emphasized by
Contingency theorists,

it was still important to set organizations and

environments apart.

Enacting Boundary
The development of a social constructionist track embodying less
deterministic notions of social constraints and an expanding conception
of human agency has brought to light the intersubjective side of
boundary-setting (Geertz,
Smircich,

1983).

1973;

Bittner,

1965;

Berger & Luckman,

With this last "interpretive turn"

(Geertz,

1967;

1983)

theories of organization as closed representational objects were forced
to compete with concepts of organizations as open texts that both
generate meaning and subvert it (Brown,
1985; Johnson,
Thus,

1978;

Gray,

Bougon & Donnellon,

1990).

uncomfortable with essentialist models of organization,

a

handful of scholars have come to view boundary as the intersection of
organizational tensions
Giddens,

1979;

Riley,

(Weick,

1983)

-

1977;

Benson,

1977;

Brown,

the locus of encounter.

1978;

As boundaries are

redefined as crucibles of reciprocative action analytic focus has
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gradually turned to how we draw our lines
Morgan,

1979; Weick,

Milliken,

1990).

(Van Maanen,

1979; Astley & Van de Ven,

Yet,

1983;

1979;
Fiol,

Burrell &
1989;

despite the fact that concepts involving cohesive

theoretical boundaries are virtually inverted in a subjectivist
literature promoting the precarious status of organizational boundaries,
the reality of the foundational organization/environment construct that
organizational boundary undergirds is never in question.

Summary
One way to grasp the literature's seemingly abiding interest in
organizational boundary is to consider the differing paradigms of
organization which boundaries serve to perpetuate.

To this end,

the

subjectivist perspective begins with a major conceptual advantage
because it assumes that boundaries are pliant intersubjective
conveniences demarking different conceptual terrains
Greenwood,

1980).

(Ranson,

Hinings,

&

Thus, boundaries are by definition open to question.

An interpretive epistemology,

in other words,

authorizes the proposal

that whereas the evolving consistency of theoretical boundaries may
reflect the literature's various concessions to changing social
circumstances;

nonetheless, boundary making continues to emanate from an

unvarying (classical core)

cognition of what organization is

cognition grounded in a particular historical time and place
1973a,

- a
(Geertz,

1973b).
This enduring classical legacy is a product of an era when

theorists and practitioners were free to draw their lines virtually at
will.

For practical and theoretical purposes,

the external environment

did not exist because countervailing interests were,
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often as not,

too

weak to gain a vote in the boundary-setting processes monopolized by
management elites

(Edwards,

1979).

preferred by Classical theorists,

The trademark castle-thick walls
therefore,

encompassed an idealized

concept of organization as the embodiment of a unitary,
However,

as the "needs"

other constituencies,
expanded,

rational core.

(read relative power) of the environment (read

e.g.,

labor,

consumers,

government,

etc.)

managements were compelled to acknowledge other stakeholders

(this recognition is implicitly reflected in Open Systems and later
Contingency theory).

Yet,

deep at heart,

the literature remained wedded

to the central planning and control inherent in the Classical school's
hierarchical,
Sabel,

1984;

dedicated, mass-production industrial paradigm (Piore &
Graham,

1991).

As yet more environmental exigencies spilled over fixed notions of
organizational frontiers,

theorists reacted by deploying two ontologies

of boundary in a rearguard effort to preserve this core industrial
identity.

In effect,

The first,

outer,

the core was encircled by two lines of defense.

membrane-like ring consisted of an intersubjective

ontology where environmental and organizational "fits” were enacted.
This interactive rim was backed up by a second inner,

objective frontier

- a theoretical Maginot Line sheltering the literature's wellhead of
coherent meaning.
tradition"

Theorizing within this "hermetically sealed

(George & Campbell,

1990),

Thompson (1967),

for example,

logically emphasizes the importance of buffering technical cores and
regulating boundary spanning action.

Such design strategies isolated

the classical paradigm from environmentally induced uncertainty by
withdrawing its hard core inward to a cool
incontestable, non-dialectical,

(dispassionate),

reified "interior"
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(see Figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1.

The Concentric Design of Organizational Ontology
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This concept of concentric ontology also enables a reinter¬
pretation of more contemporary theorizing.
1981)

Oliver Williamson's

influential analyses of transactions costs,

for example,

(1975;
can now

be seen to represent a form of conceptual retrenchment or irredentism
wherein a problematic environment is ultimately subordinated to the
static imperatives of the

(core)

centralized ideal.

With boundary made

permanent once again and the variability of the marketplace
environment)

(the

thereby normalized, Williamson is able to restore the

classical ideal to its original form.

The theoretical core and the

organization in its entirety are made one again (Figure 2.2).
This suggests that the literature's boundaries preserve a way of
thinking dedicated to the maintenance of a "fixed order"
organizing.

Boundaries,

in other words,

(Cox,

1981) of

operate to constrain and often

foreclose debate on the prospects and nature of change ignited by the
global social and economic forces now underway (Attali,

1991).

Thus,

core theory remains blind to or incapable of explaining the complex
interpenetrations of institutions and ideas arising from an environment
driven by the "internationalization of economic authority"
Campbell,
structures

1990),

sweeping deregulation of traditional institutional

(Graff,

1979;

Dickson,

1984;

Lyotard,

1984),

dissemination of flexible manufacturing technologies
1988;

Huber,

(George &

and the

(Nemetz & Fry,

1990).

At this point it becomes necessary to ask if the literature has
unwittingly entered a Kuhnian (1962) watershed where prevailing
functionalist concepts of organizing are simply too neat -

to engage the present swirl of interdependent events?

"interrogate present knowledge",

too discrete

Failure to

Der Derian (1989) warns in another
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\

Figure 2.2.

Transaction Cost Analysis:
Prototype Form
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Containing Uncertainty With

literature but an admonishment perhaps no less meaningful for our own,
not only cuts short the possibilities latent in the discovery of new
discursive spaces

(Graham,

1991), but runs the risk of reducing theory

to a procrustean bed (Georgiou,

1973).

This concern is exemplified in the recent January,

1992, AMJ

article by Parthasarthy and Sethi where the authors attempt to force fit
the dynamic integrative design implications of CAD-CAM technology into
the inert symmetry of the classical paradigm.
Graham (1991) points out,

The irony,

as Julie

is that not only are scholars and

practitioners authorized to imitate such conceptually incommensurable
mixtures, but this kind of theorizing is often awarded credit for
breaking new ground.
The coherence and unity innate to regnant conceptualizations of
organization,
cut.

However,

environment,

and "fits” depend on margins that are clear-

it is the ambiguity surfacing in the wake of the

institutional interpenetration taking place on no less than a global
scale that is transforming hard,

sharp boundaries into a problematic.

The apparent disjuncture between the documented scale and reach of
institutional interdependencies and the legacy of calibrated assumptions
shaping organizational theory warrants an examination of the empirical
consistency of organizational boundary.

Since conceptualizations of

organizations as bounded and predictable entities depend on boundaries
being physically there,

the possible epistemological ramifications

surrounding this issue may profoundly affect how organizational
normality and anomaly are represented.

Ipso facto,

a need exists to

focus analysis on the ontology of boundary so that scholars can be more
confident in the questions that they ask about organizing.

27

But where

and how is this to be done?

The next chapter (3) documents the

interdependent condition of American research universities.

Chapters 4

and 5 discuss a pragmatic analytic approach to the these important
issues.

Endnotes

1.

Anticipating open systems and coalitional concepts, Barnard
problematized a settled ontology of boundaries and organizations.
Working from a macro-perspective of organizational action, Barnard
prodded contemporaries to embrace a more inclusive model - one
acknowledging environmental interdependencies.
Hence, it is
important to recognize that his cooperative ideal of organizing
was not exclusively confined to employees ("insides"), but
incorporated consumers, suppliers, and other constituents
customarily left "outside" orthodox concepts.
In Barnard's view,
the "material of organizations" actualizes "When the acts of two
or more individuals are cooperative, that is, systematically
coordinated, the acts by my definition constitute an organization"
(Barnard, 1940: 297).

2.

Selznick regarded the environment with frank suspicion.
In his
view management achieved pyrrhic victories at best when attempting
to placate external constituencies (see his TVA and the
Grassroots. 1949).
Parsons tried to introduce a more balanced
view of the environment.
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CHAPTER 3

ENACTING AMERICAN RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES

The debate within

the university centers on how the university can

obtain added income from participation in commercial ventures while
maintaining its

integrity and basic values.

National Science Board (1982)

Introduction
Proceeding from a social constructionist perspective,

this research

treats university boundaries as contingent social "achievements"
1978),

and organizational "facts"

rationality,

goals,

1977; Manning,
Greenwood,
1985).

1982;

1980;

Likewise,

etc.) as things derived (Silverman,
Riley,

Giddens,

1983;

1979;

1983; Quinn & Rohrbaugh,

Bartunek,

Benson,

"organization"

of meanings and processes,

Accordingly,

(environments, hierarchies,

1977;

Gray,

Hinings &

Smircich & Stubbart,
precarious ensemble

tensions and contradictions

1983;

rules,

1971; Weick,

Ranson,

itself denotes a

(Benson,

Bougon & Donnellon,

1977,

1985).

the university qua organization neither qualifies as an

island nor a non-contradictory whole.
does not exist.

1984;

(Brown,

Rather,

Indeed,

the "university" as such

"it" is advanced as a socially constructed

phenomenon predicated on an ongoing "negotiated consensus" reflecting
the self-interested and competing claims of various stakeholders

(Cyert

& March,

1988;

1963; Ansoff,

Freeman,

1984;

McGrath,

1985).

1965; Ackoff,

Quinn & Rohrbaugh,

1974;

Freeman,

1984; Rule,

1983; Quinn & Cameron,

Regarding the substantivity of academic boundaries,

1983; Quinn &

then,

the

interpretive appraisal foregrounds three interrelated themes in the
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organizational literature.

One,

the concept of boundary underscores

higher education's embeddedness within and indebtedness to a larger
context (Granovetter,

1985:

Clegg,

universities in isolation (i.e.,
Traditionalists

1990).

To constitute elite

surrounded by high fixed walls) as

(and to a lesser extent)

Instrumentalists are wont to

do underplays the reciprocative power relations linking universities to
their environments.

Second,

the dialectical opposition between autonomy

and discipline underlying the concept of boundary is a recurring,
unresolved,
Argyris,

theme in the organizational literature

1964;

Lawler,

1977;

Giddens,

1979;

Perrow,

(Barnard,
1986).

albeit

1938;
And third,

recognition of the inherent ambiguity of organizational boundary -

that

social boundaries are always pending - prompts us to regard boundaries
as the dialectical dimension (rather than the mathematical space) where
people confront their social arrangements

(Benson,

1977).

Research universities represent particularly attractive settings for
exploring the substance of organizational boundary.

For one,

important

constituencies are currently "negotiating" the normative lines
governing "the way science is used in our societies and the way in which
it is supposed to be generated"
1985).

In addition,

(Introduction to Gibbons & Wittrock,

important aspects of the concentric theoretical

model introduced in the previous chapter are featured in this debate.
"Traditionalists," for example,

largely view academic partici¬

pation as essentially a "moral involvement"

(Grimes & Cornwall,

1987).

The incursion of remunerative considerations threatens to undo the
established normative framework of solidarity and trust (incarnated in
publication and peer review) underpinning the open community of
scholars.

In particular,

the university's signifying (core)
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educational,

knowledge producing and,

not least,

in danger of being compromised by the myopic,
major business benefactors,

critical functions are

profit imperatives driving

regardless of honest intentions.

Thus,

although the American university exists in a perpetual state of fiscal
dependency, making partnerships with government and major industrial
interests1 obligatory; nonetheless,

the implications of these power-

skewed coalitions for the university's social-organizational structure
cannot be underestimated.
The Instrumentalist,

on the other hand, visualizes new

entrepreneural university/industry arrangements as mutually pragmatic.
The university wins a steady source of research money without an excess
of government red tape, help from industry in making new discoveries
commercially useful,
students,

potential employment opportunities for its

and stimulating faculty-industry interactions.

For its part,

industry gains access to new sources of ideas and technology,
of potential research employees,

a source

and the ability to draw on top

scientists without having to expand in-house research capacity.
sum,

In

industrial/university arrangements represent a natural and

pragmatic closure between university science and the "scientified"
vanguard of industry (Stankiewicz,

1986).

These synopses capture the Traditionalist/Instrumentalist antithesis
on a factual level.

But theoretical purposes require that this

opposition be converted into the specifications of the concentric
metaphor.

For example,

as with orthodox organizational theory, both

Traditionalists and Instrumentalists share the efficacy of insides
(order)

and outsides

(disorder).

That the university and its
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environment coexist in a dichotomy of separate realms is taken as fact.
But a key theoretical difference separates the two discourses.
Specifically,

Traditionalists and Instrumentalists attribute

different ontologic meanings

(substantivities)

to organizational

boundary because each situates organization/environmental tensions in a
different theoretical place.

Traditionalists,

as we have seen,

concentrate on the integrity of the academy's purported core repository
of first principles.
marketplace,

In light of the alleged hegemonic reach of the

the Traditionalist takes every precaution to insulate the

core behind a indelible bulwark of permanent,
Instrumentalists,

on the other hand,

impregnable walls.

locate the industry/ university

interface at a reasonably safe distance from the core - at the academy's
fringes.

This theoretical separation,

unlike the Traditionalist,

then,

allows the Instrumentalist,

to sleep through the night.

imperatives notwithstanding,

Market

it is not in industry's long-term self-

interest to tamper with the academy's core intellectual processes.
Traditionalists need to face up to the fact that American universities
have never enjoyed an extrahistorical immunity to "worldly motives".
Indeed,

the Instrumentalist contends,

depends on two-way interactions,

the university's social relevance

not obstructionism.

Besides,

in

addition to the equilibrium inherent in situations governed by mutual
self-interest,

preservation of the academy's core values is assured as

long as the university's distinctive educational and communications
mechanisms are contractually sanctioned (buffered)
In sum,

(Reams,

two items can be inferred from this discussion.

1986).
One,

the

continued unproblematic status of the literature's intellectual core
depends upon which discourse ultimately predominates.
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The moral unity

of the core paradigm is predicated completely on the factual reality of
fixed Traditionalist boundaries.
boundaries,

on the other hand,

"conditions of possibility"

The osmotic nature of Instrumentalist

problematizes the core's exclusive

(Miller & O'Leary,

1989).

coherent boundaries are not validated by our findings,
happen.

In effect,
two things

The assumed congruence of the core is opened to doubt.

theory is nudged closer to adopting a more macro

if

Also,

(Barnardian)

perspective - one incorporating "insides" and "outsides."
Second,

it is consistent to consider the Traditionalist and

Instrumentalist discourses as theoretical enactments in themselves.
Indeed,

the opposition they enact is not the product of a single,

priviledged reading, but grounded in a genealogy of past events. Just as
the concentric organizational model was a response to specific
historical circumstances,

there is similar cause to articulate the

Traditionalist/Instrumentalist negotiation as an ongoing and reciprocal
social engagement with a dynamic social environment (Graff,
Indeed,

1985).

a strong argument can be made that from the beginning,

autonomy was out of the question for an institution charged with the
training and enculturation of future generations of American citizens
(Wolin,

1981). As both patrons and benefactors of education,

industry

and the state maintained an abiding ideological interest in curriculum,
research and faculty hiring practices
1986).

(Noble,

1977; Wolin,

1981;

Price,

"...the relationship between higher education and social change

is circular and interdependent with both transforming each other
(Jarausch,

1983:

9).

Later, with the consolidation of industry,

government and science during and after WWII,

the university moved from

the sidelines to the center of the nation's modernization process.
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A

host of factors including the continued academization and
scientification of key technologies has opened the door for new profitmotivated business/ university alliances.

The following sections

describe these developments in more detail.

Universitv/Industrv Relations:

An Interpretive History

In the Beginning: At Arm's Length
Since the turn of the century and before,

corporate philanthropy has

supplemented university capital budgets and underwritten universitybased research.

In return,

industry with "applied,

the American university has supplied

fundamental research,

and research manpower"

recognized even at that time as essential to the continued development
of science-based industry

(Noble,

1977:

128).

Over the years,

university/industry linkage was strengthened by scholarships,
consultancies,

research grants and outright gifts.

the

faculty

Businessmen served

as university trustees as well as benefactors and some academic
departments

(engineering,

natural sciences and management)

their curriculums to correspond with industry needs
Industrys'

interest were largely utilitarian.

(NSB,

tailored
1982).

The university

contributed by "critically reviewing and systemitizing the accumulated
technical knowledge" and trained future workers and researchers
(Stankiewicz,

1986).

Not least,

sponsoring university research has

allowed business to shift some of the cost and risk of basic research to
the public sector (Noble,

1977;

Dickson,

1984).

Although private and industrial endowments played a leading role
prior to the turn of the century,
stress basic science and teaching.

colleges and universities continued to
The bulk of Ph.D.s sought work
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within the academy.

No direct link existed between Ph.D.

industrial requirements.

production and

Although always interested in new discovery

industrial research remained devoted to improving manufacturing
processes and the exploration of new product applications.
whole,

Thus,

on the

the knowledge transfer mechanisms between the university and

industry could generally be characterized as indirect because industrial
technology was largely ad hoc and empirical.
However,

industry interest in university research increased

dramatically with the advent of large science-based industries electrical and chemical - during the first decades of the twentieth
century (Baer,

1978).

chemists' war"),

The impetus of the First World War ("the

combined with the mushrooming list of new products

emerging from industrial laboratories and independent research
institutes served to reinforce industry's linkage to science - and the
university.

As a result,

industry multiplied.

direct links between the university and

For example,

climbed even during the Depression,

the number of graduate fellowships
gifts of specialized equipment

increased along with the practice of industrial consultantships
1982:

219-220).

But David Noble

(1977)

(NSB,

cautions that this intensifying

relationship was more than a marriage of mutual convenience:
Perhaps more important,

it (industry sponsorship of university

research) redefined the form and content of scientific research
itself.
This involved more than the general shift away from the
search for truth and toward utility which had already been well
underway by the turn of the century.
Now the shift toward
utility assumed particular forms, molded by the specific,
historical needs of private industry....This reorientation
affected not only what kinds of questions would be asked but
also what particular questions would be asked, which problems
would be investigated, what sorts of solutions would be sought,
what conclusions would be drawn.
Science had, indeed, been
pressed into the service of capital
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(147).

A_New Federal/University Contract:

The Room Years 1942-1966

While industry support for university research more than doubled
between 1953 and 1966,
monies,

given the unprecedented infusion of federal

its share of total university R&D support declined sharply from

eight to two percent (Baer,

1978:

63).

Indeed,

in the two decades

following WWII the federal share of R&D support steadily increased
eventually peaking at 74 percent of all university R&D in 1966 and 77
percent of all basic campus research (Baer,

1978:

63).

By 1966,

colleges and universities accounted for 46 percent of the total funds
for basic research.

(This figure climbed to 53 percent in 1975.)

•••despite great fiscal pressures, universities managed to increase and
consolidate their positions... as the predominant performers of basic
research in the United States"
Not surprisingly,

(Baer,

1978: 71).

the links between the university and industry

softened during this period (Baer,

1978; Dickson,

1984).

The glamour of

high-tech, performance-oriented defense and space related work drew
faculty and newly-minted PhDs away from more conventional industrial
research.

Virtually overnight, academic work was exciting,

funded and with a shortage of Ph.D.s

- jobs plentiful.

lavishly

"In an

expanding era it all too easy to believe that only the second-rate
student or worse need be relegated to industry, government, or
nonresearch teaching positions"

(Baer,

1978: 86).

Industry went

begging, prompting a vice president of R&D at Koppers to complain that
"Too many (employable candidates) are overspecialized in (disciplinary)
training and not interested in broadening their horizons" (Baer, 1978:
86).

Other forces were also at work.

Specifically,

industry's share of

total basic research funds slipped from 36 percent in 1955 to 22 percent
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by 1966 (to 16 percent by 1975)

(Baer,

1978:

66).

Among other things,

inflation and an uncertain economy in the late '60s and early '70s
induced management to emphasize applied over basic research.
Nonetheless, despite these events the original motives for
industry/university collaboration remained intact.
"systemic institutionalized connection"

(Ravetz,

Indeed,

1971:

the

38) between

important science and industry may have actually been fortified.

The

growing allocation of federal dollars during the war and again in the
years between the Sputnik launch (1957) and 1966 helped to prepare the
way for the renewed industry/university collaborations that were to
follow.
Science and the university were never quite the same again.

For

example:
1) In short order, university science was transformed into Big
"industrialized" Science (Ravetz,

1971)

- a capital- and labor-

intensive activity highly sensitive to cyclical changes in
funding patterns.

Following the example set by the Manhattan

Project during the war, science was hereafter to be performed by
large,

specialized teams working with sophisticated and

expensive equipment.

"This change is as radical as that which

occurred in the productive economy when independent artisan
producers were displaced by capital-intensive factory production
employing hired labor"

(Ravetz,

1971: 44).

No school, much less

a department or individual scientist, could afford to pay for
research independently.

Alliances with outside sources - even

government in peacetime - were now taken for granted.
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2) The immense cost associated with modern laboratory research
mandated new forms of accountability and

distribution.

Henceforth, decisions effecting the content and trajectory of
university research were concentrated in a handful of missionoriented agencies (AEC, NASA, DOD, Office of Naval Research, the
NSF, etc.).
control,

"With this concentration of powers of decision and

the free marketplace of scientific results, whose value

is established after they are offered and by informal consensus,
is replaced by an oligopoly of investing agencies, whose prior
decisions determine what will eventually come on to the market"
(Ravetz,

1971: 45).

Savvy university scientists quickly adapted

to this new entrepreneurial (fund-raising) and administrative
(bureaucratic) environment.

Moreover,

the unprecedented

expenses involved insured that basic research was concentrated
in a few dozen select universities (Muller in Logsdon).

Not

every campus was awarded a cyclotron.
3) The massive infusion of federal funds spawned a widespread

R&D

infrastructure consisting of university and government
laboratories, non-profit research institutions,

in-house

industrial research, and a new class of federally funded
research and development centers (FFRDC's) managed by both
universities and industrial firms.

The relationships within

this R&D network directly correlate with the level of federal
support.

These relationships,

therefore, became highly

competitive after federal monies stabilized after 1966-67.
addition,

In

the FFRDC's allowed university faculty opportunity to

divide their time between academic and non-academic project

38

environments and form working connections within business and
government.

These connections prepared the ground for

subsequent complaints about "conflicts of institutional
interest" that surfaced in the late 1970s.
4) Formed in the crucible of the Second World War,

the tensions of

the cold war, and the rise of the new global economy the new
alliance permanently binding the university to the needs of
industry and the state was built on three on-going rationales
directly affecting the autonomy of the university.
on-campus research had to acquire more relevance.

One,

that

Relevant to

whom and to what ends was customarily decided by whoever was
paying for the research.

Given the ever rising cost of high-

tech research the call for academic relevance was,
self-justifying.

in effect,

For example, Lyndon Johnson wanted expensive

university research to serve the (health, environmental, urban
and educational) needs of his Great Society program.

The Nixon

adminis- tration used "irrelevance" to justify dismantling many
scientific projects (e.g., NASA) after the Vietnam-stretched
economy began to manifest symptoms of over-heating
terms,

(in real

federal support for basic research decreased by 10%

between 1968 and 1971)

(Dickson,

1984:

29).

scientific discovery could be managed, and,

Second,

that

if warranted, the

scientific establishment mobilized to serve the needs of the
state in times of crisis.

The Manhattan Project was the

archetypical case, of course.

But science was to be mobilized

by international exigencies again with the surprise launch of
the Russian Sputnik satellite in 1957.
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Since the mid-1970's

university science has been redirected to the specific needs of
industry as the Carter and Reagan administrations looked to
science and technology to fend off stagflation - and the
Japanese; while university officials sought more reliable
funding sources.

And finally, science was reconceptualized as

an investment rather than simply overhead (Dickson, 1984).

In

other words, even though the contribution of science to economic
expansion can only be assumed at this time, science was now
deemed central to the expansion of capital and favorable
balances of trade.
in the long run,

"The theory that began to emerge was that,

the economy would remain healthy only through a

continuous infusion of new technological innovations - and that
this could be assured only by continued support for basic
science"

(Dickson,

1973 to the Present:

1984:

32).

The New Consolidation

Juxtaposed to the business/university estrangement of the 1960's,
ties between select universities and industry grew measureably stronger
over the next two decades.

Industry support for total university R&D

rose from 3% in the late 1970's to 5% in 1984 (due to the immense
federal science budget,
3% in 1978)

industry's share had tumbled from 10% in 1955 to

(Stankiewicz,

1986:21).

Indeed,

in constant terms,

industrial support doubled between 1966 and 1978 (Stankiewicz, 1986) and
expanded by 8.5% per year, on average, between 1981-1984 - surpassing
increases in industrial in-house research expenditure (NSB).
other indicators of change as well.

There were

For example, even though employment

in high-tech firms was declining between 1981 and 1983, 4,800 doctoral
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scientists and engineers (about 3% of the total) moved from the academia
to industry, while 1,700 moved in the other direction (NSB).
addition,

In

from 1973 to 1982 the proportion of industry authored papers

with academic co-authors jumped from 13 to 24 percent (NSB).

This ratio

was even higher in biology (50%) and biomedicine and clinical medicine
(NSB).
The pendulum is swinging back the other way.

Universities are

seeking long-term research support, free of government overhead and red
tape, and industrial firms are seeking greater control over the
direction of new scientific and technological developments and a greater
proprietary interest in these developments (Noble & Pfund,
Briefly,

1980).

this shift is generally attributed to the following factors:

(1) Industry's switch in research strategy from "defensive research"
(product incrementalism and manufacturing process improvements) to a
more product innovative emphasis;
fabricative" era (Rose,

(2) America's entrance into a "post-

1985) entailing a structural shift away from

traditional manufacturing industry to reliance on a new high-tech,
science-propelled economy (computers and related industy, genetic
engineering);

(3) industry's consequent renewed interest in fundamental

research sectors (the university); and (4) White House anxiety over the
erosion of the country's technological lead to other industrialized
nations.

As of late,

this trajectory has been lubricated with new and

more liberal interpretations of patent laws and significant tax breaks
for industry research expenditures (the Economic Recovery Tax of 1981).
Innovation emerged a national priority in the Nixon, Carter and Reagan
eras.

Brains had come to represent the new competitive trump card,

"...intellectual capital - scientific resources and the aptitude for
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technological innovation - constitutes the major asset of industrialized
countries in the new modes of international competition and inter¬
dependence"
1980:

(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,

20).

Not surprisingly,

the new competitive highground embodied in the

mobilization of scientific and technical innovation fostered new
linkages between industry,

state and university.

entailed a quantum change in science policy.

Overall,

One,

these changes

support for basic

research was to be largely channeled into those areas of research that
held promise to make industry more competitive.
Reagan,

Particularly under

the private sector was given the upper hand in setting the

research agenda (Dickson,

1984).

Second,

the application of research

outcomes was to be largely determined by the private sector and market
forces

(Dickson,

1984;

Noble & Pfund,

1980).

Unlike the paramount purpose of government-sponsored research
with universities where furtherance of the public interest is
the goal, industry investments in university research are by
desire and obligation centered on the ultimate goal of making a
profit....When investing in university research, industry often
will place its ultimate profit goal ahead of any service
interest to the public at large.
With the contracts between
industry and universities and the resulting shift from public
to private investment in research, a new forum is created which
is governed by different rules and goals (Reams, 1986: 107).
The new partnership took many forms,
example,

some old and some new.

For

traditional cross-fertilization in the form of increased

industrial consultancies,

grants and fellowships was reemphasized.

"Connections between industrial research associations and universities
also gained new prominence"

(NSB:

233).

fickle nature of federal funding cycles,

But,

chary of the relatively

university administrators and

researchers increasingly sought more permanent and stable alliances.
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In

"Internally,"

the intensity of mixed-sector interconnections and their

possible repercussions on the academy's "practical consciousness"
(Giddens,

1979)

(the largely tacit knowledge individuals use to define

and navigate social environments) has varied by discipline.

For

example, while the financial condition of the liberal arts remains
highly problematic

(Daniels,

1989;

Berger,

1989),

over the last decade

university-based researchers in some natural sciences have been
allegedly exposed to unprecedented pressure to commercialize their work.
These pressures seem to be particularly acute in rapidly developing
technologies where innovation depends entirely on large-scale, high-tech
research motivated by the prospect of vast commercial reward (Fuchsberg,
1989) .
This suggests that no single discourse of science
be said to prevail today.

Indeed,

(the academy) can

contemporary scientific discourse

might well be characterized as a cacophony of voices.
Pons/Fleischmann episode indicates,

As the

even practicing scientists are

experiencing difficulty understanding one another (Raymond,
is clear,

however,

1989).

What

is that opinion differs sharply as to the boundaries

delineating the spheres of academic and market behavior.

Negotiating University Boundaries
From an interpretive point of view,

the unanswered question is what

are the consequences for the academy's purported core "provinces of
meanings"

(Ranson,

Hinings & Greenwood,

1980)

science is redefined as a business asset?

if university-based

Accordingly,

this research

treats the Traditionalist and Instrumentalist schools as "rival frames
of reference"

(Smircich,

1983a)

- each denoting a singular "way of
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knowing" grounded in perceptions about the function of knowledge
(Lyotard,

1979).

The Instrumentalist,

for example, purportedly values

knowledge for its use-value - its potential for product realization.
contrast,

In

the Traditionalist validates the heuristic power of knowledge.

The domain of a particular frame or discourse
to bracket and pay attention to"

(Smircich, 1983)

- "what one chooses
- is enacted through

linguistic relationships that prescribe the cognitive boundaries of
permissable conversational and social intercourse.
various constituencies,

in other words,

The university's

interpret action according to

the constructed boundaries they set for themselves (inside) and others
(outside)

(Brown,

1978; Weick,

1979; Putnam & Pacanowsky,

1983; Conrad,

1983).
From this perspective, social boundaries emerge from interpretive
consensus or conflict (Conrad,

1983).

If the product of consensus,

boundaries demarking relatively stable patterns of meaning and structure
tend to grow thicker and more opaque with regular use (Berger &
Luckmann,

1966).

As products of a social context, however,

and rules of discourse are inherently unstable (Calas,

the content

1987).

Disputed

boundaries entailing clashes between competing interpretations sometimes
lead to structural change.

Conflicted boundaries,

therefore, figure as

boundaries "under discussion."
The partisan split over the contemporary dynamics of university/
industry relations qualifies American research universities as prime
examples of organizations where boundaries encompassing values, norms,
and meaning structures are under discussion.

Every opinion composing

this discourse radiates outward from the basic pro-market (Lyon, 1982);
NSF,

1982; Reams,

1986; Lynton & Elman,
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1987; Powers, 1988) non-market

(Noble & Pfund,

1980; Dickson,

1989) opposition.3

1984; Nelkin,

1984; Rule, 1988; Schaffer,

To enlist with one side or the other,

therefore,

is

to affiliate with a different set of boundaries regarding the purpose of
university-produced knowledge,

its mode of production and the standards

by which it is judged relevant (Lentricchia & McLaughlin,

1990).4

Thus, Traditionalists view academic and industrial science as two
distinct cultural realms each with its own logic and authority (Nelkin,
1984; Dickson,

1984; Krimsky, 1987; Schaffer,

1989).

Research is deemed

a form of power and intention and the progeny of a vulnerable (and
venerable) social structure.

To the Instrumentalist, on the other hand,

research is not to be indulged as an esoteric exercise, but employed as
a practical instrument of social and economic transformation.

As the

laboratories of social change, universities are obliged to strike a
bargain with the marketplace (Prager & Omenn,
Fowler,

1984; OECD,

1984; Lynton,

1987).

1980; Rosenzweig,

1982;

Instrumentalists propose to

"modernize" campus science by revamping its normative boundaries.
Traditionalists prefer to quarantine university science by reinforcing
boundaries purportedly already in place.

In the final analysis, each

perspective wants to impose a different moral structure (Etzioni, 1971;
Gibbons & Wittrock,

1985; Grimes & Cornwall,

1987).

A deductive reading of the topical Traditionalist/Instrumentalist
literature finds that the opposition between these two frames of
reference is replayed along the dimensions shown below.

Samples of

Traditionalist and Instrumentalist opinion statements used in our
subject survey follow each category.
Property - Traditionalists believe that the proprietary logic of the
competitive marketplace will drive open intellectual discourse (the
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(Noble & Pfund,
1989)

1980;

opposition.3

Dickson,

1984;

Nelkin,

1984;

Rule,

1988;

To enlist with one side or the other,

Schaffer,

therefore,

is

to affiliate with a different set of boundaries regarding the purpose of
university-produced knowledge,

its mode of production and the standards

by which it is judged relevant (Lentricchia & McLaughlin,
Thus,

1990).4

Traditionalists view academic and industrial science as two

distinct cultural realms each with its own logic and authority (Nelkin,
1984;

Dickson,

1984;

Krimsky,

1987;

Schaffer,

1989).

Research is deemed

a form of power and intention and the progeny of a vulnerable
venerable)

social structure.

To the Instrumentalist,

(and

on the other hand,

research is not to be indulged as an esoteric exercise, but employed as
a practical instrument of social and economic transformation.
laboratories of social change,
bargain with the marketplace
Fowler,

1984;

OECD,

1984;

As the

universities are obliged to strike a

(Prager & Omenn,

Lynton,

1987).

1980;

Rosenzweig,

1982;

Instrumentalists propose to

"modernize" campus science by revamping its normative boundaries.
Traditionalists prefer to quarantine university science by reinforcing
boundaries purportedly already in place.

In the final analysis,

perspective wants to impose a different moral structure
Gibbons & Wittrock,

1985;

Grimes & Cornwall,

(Etzioni,

each
1971;

1987).

A deductive reading of the topical Traditionalist/Instrumentalist
literature finds that the opposition between these two frames of
reference is replayed along the dimensions shown below.

Samples of

Traditionalist and Instrumentalist opinion statements used in our
subject survey follow each category.
Property - Traditionalists believe that the proprietary logic of the
competitive marketplace will drive open intellectual discourse
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(the

lynchpin of the academic social matrix) underground (Chubin,
Broad,

1988;

Bourke,

1989).

1985;

Instrumentalists answer that varying

degrees of secrecy and competition are inherent in the social relations
of science

(e.g.,

priority claims)

(Rosenzweig,

Traditionalist Opinion Statement:
open exchanges of information.

1982;

Hull,

1985).

Science is nourished by free and

There is no place for proprietary

knowledge in the academy.
Instrumentalist Opinion Statement:

Modest changes in university

rules regarding intellectual property will allow commercial activities
to go forward without threatening traditional values.
Entrepreneurism - The Traditionalist argues that the narrow,

self-

oriented ethos of capital is diametrically opposed to the deontological
traditions of academic science
Noble,

1989).

(Werth,

1988;

Leary,

1989; Minsky &

The Instrumentalist replies that academic science today

underwrites the nation's military and economic security.
not,

Like it or

in modern societies universities are key factors of production.

For those idealists who still entertain doubts,

passage of the

University and Small Business Patent Act of 1980 and other legislation
makes the university's commercial status official (Rosenzweig,
Gupta,

1985;

1990).

Traditionalist Opinion Statement:

If you make the ethics of

academic science the same as Wall Street, you're going to corrupt
science.
Instrumentalist Opinion Statement:

There's nothing inappropriate

for academic scientists, while holding regular academic appointments,
be proprietors, exclusively or jointly, in private business firms in
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to

which scientific knowledge gained in their academic capacity is to be
used.
Disinterestedness

- According to Traditionalists,

the existence of a

unified scientific community with its exceptional social relationships
and functions

(the dialectical processes of discovery,

critique - a sanctuary for tradition,

education and

diversity and independent

commentary) necessitate an uncommon degree of institutional autonomy
(Leavitt,

1988; Wheeler,

1989;

Blum,

1990).

The Instrumentalist replies

that "American universities are among the most permeable of social
institutions"

(Rosenzweig,

1985:

41).

Universities and good science

have never existed in isolation, but do their best work when fulfilling
societal needs.

Corporate and public interest are virtually identical,

and commerce is the most efficacious route to public use of academic
invention (Prager and Omenn,

1980).

Traditionalist Opinion Statement:
much time faculty can devote

to

Limits should be placed on how

outside concerns.

The one-fifth rule

allowing one day per week is fair and adequate.

Instrumentalist Opinion Statement:

Conflicts of interest can be

minimized or avoided altogether by vigilance and good faith.
Choice and Design of Work - Caldart (1983) conveys the
Traditionalist fear of Huxleyian subversion when he writes "the fabric
of academic research could be slowly rewoven on industry's loom."
Indeed,

the practical consequences of such cultural experimentation

(university/industry alliances)

are clear.

More and more academic

scientists will come to think like their industry counterparts
1983;

Goldman,

self-interest,

1987;

Nelkin & Nelson,

1987).

(Ashford,

Industry may be driven by

the Instrumentalist admits, but its leadership is not
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unaware of the contribution of basic research to the on-going health of
commercial infrastructure and corporate competitiveness.

This awareness

assures that the needs of basic science are not about to be sacrificed
for short-term financial gain (Stankiewicz,

1986;

Bleveins & Ewer,

1988) .

Traditionalist Opinion Statement:

With industrial support,

there is

relatively less freedom for the researcher because there is now a single
line to follow,

the line of the generous benefactor.

Instrumentalist Opinion Statement:

The legal safeguards built into

large corporate-university contracts plus procedural limits established
by the university are more than adequate to protect the institutional
autonomy of the academic scientific community.
The Organization of Work - The Traditionalist worries that because
large contractual arrangements increase industry's proprietary
"presence" on campus

(Caldart,

1983), more pressure will be created to

remake academic departments into profit centers.

In addition,

departmental sovereignty will be further undermined by the multi¬
disciplinary nature of technocratic problem solving (Krimsky,
Minsky,

1989).

1987;

The Instrumentalist believes that such claims are

unfounded (Roy,

1972).

Traditionalist Opinion Statement:

Policy concerning university-

industry relations should be set and resolved at the department level.
(Both statements in this category expressed Traditionalist opinion.)
Collectivity - The Traditionalist holds that action occurs at the
cultural/structural level;

actors create and manuever within shared

social frames that constrain choice
1988;

Harris,

1989; McDonald,

(Gibbons & Wittrock,

1990).
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Whereas,

1985;

Rule,

the Instrumentalist

counters that while prudence is called for there is no hard evidence to
show that new university/industry alliances will place any more pressure
to sacrifice university traditions than in the past (Rosenzweig,

Traditionalist Opinion Statement:

1982).

There are bound to be adverse

consequences in terms of collaboration among faculty in various
departments if one group must worry about protecting corporate rights to
licenses.

(Both statements in this category expressed Traditionalist

opinion.)
Quality Control - The Traditionalist is concerned that peer review
will be displaced as the marketplace arbiters the direction,
quality of academic work.

Furthermore,

process and

the temptation to cheat will

increase as independent replicative and quality control mechanisms are
bypassed (Fuchsberg,

1989; McDonald,

Instrumentalists hold that formal

1989;

Crease & Samios,

1991).

(contractual) regulations are

sufficient to protect the integrity of the academy's formal and informal
work practices

(Bremer,

1985; Reams,

1986).

Traditionalist Opinion Statement:

Corporate sponsorship should be

subject to peer review.

Instrumentalist Opinion Statement:

Too much weight is given to the

role of peer-reviewed journals in the process of scientific
communication.

Science doesn't not exist until it is published.

Reward Structure/Facultv Recruitment Criteria - For a variety of
environmental and contractual reasons,

the Traditionalist asserts,

current university/industry alliances are qualitatively different from
the philanthropic relationships of the past (Noble & Pfund,

1980).

One

result is that grantsmanship activities will be made an integral part of
faculty hiring and tenure processes

(Holtzman,
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1985;

Rule,

1988).

The

Instrumentalist would likely reply that this is no time to lament a lost
(romantic) vision of the world.

It might not be a bad idea if all

faculty were obliged to develop revenue-generating projects as part of
their academic responsibility.

Why not make a professor's ability to

generate funds a condition of tenure?
Instrumentalist Opinion Statement:

It does not make any difference

if the private sector replaces or complements government as the patron
of science as long as the professional reward system of academe is
preserved.

(Both statements in this category expressed Instrumentalist

opinion.)
These oppositions

(rendered schematically in Figure 3.1) provide the

conceptual building material for the faculty boundary construction to
follow.

Confidence in the validity of the Traditionalist/

Instrumentalist discourse and the ontology of the literature's concepts
of boundary,

organizations,

and environments will depend on how faculty

representing different disciplines and market involvements draw their
lines.

For example,

is membership in the academy today motivated by an

overriding moral commitment to an altruistic Mertonian ideal5 (Etzioni,
1971; Argyris,

1975),

or are faculty gravitating toward new instru-

mentally-motivated extramural allegiances
1977;

Etzkowitz,

altogether novel?

1983)

-

(Silverman,

some conflation of the two,

1971;

Cummings,

or something

The empirical responses to these questions should

shed some light on whether the lines constructed by those presumably
directly involved in the construction of academic boundaries,

i.e.,

active faculty, validate the a priori isolation of organizations and
environments.
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VALUES
TRADITIONALIST
The University as a Non-Economic
Institution

INSTRUMENTALIST
The University as an
Economic Institution

Classical Form:
Knowledge is virtue: university
a public investment, public interest science.
Clear boundaries between academic and industrial
science.
Ambiguity accompanies each benefit of
university/industry partnerships - a crisis of
identity for the university (Noble & Pfund, 1980;
Nelkin, 1984; Rule, 1988; Schaffer, 1989).

Foundation of Industrial Society:
Knowledge as productivity.
Clear social
benefits.
The University is an adaptive
institution.
The object is to strike a
bargain with the marketplace.
The
university is a public and private
resource (Lyon, 1982; Reams, 1986;
Lynton & Elman, 1987).

Contradictory Tensions
The tensions emanating from this debate
bring out the latent contradictions of
the university as a "unity of opposites."
These are expressed as explicit an¬
tagonisms involving academic norms and
practice.

STRUCTURE
Normative Structure

BEHAVIOR
Practice/Identity

The academy as a collectivity:
Com¬
mitment understood as a moral involvement.
Clear restraints on acquisitiveness and
rivalry.
The subordination of ego.
General references to levels of trust and
academic values (Nelkin, 1984; Grimes &
Cornwall, 1987; Etzkowitz, 1989).

Choice & Design of Work:
Work to be
controlled by internal or external
constituencies?
For science or industry?
Applied vs. Basic?
The respective
emphases on teaching, research, and
service (Etzkowitz, 1989; Langitt, et
al., 1983; Rosenzweig, 1982).

Property:
The limits of ownership of
intellectual property; the commodification
of knowledge and the issue of secrecy
(Nelkin, 1984; Noble & Pfund, 1980;
Gibbons & Wittrick, 1985).

The Organization of Work:
The integrity
of departmental structure.
Commitments
to outside institutions (consulting,
advisory roles, etc.).
Increasing
administrative control; funding patterns
(Etzkowitz, 1989; Krimsky, 1987; Noble &
Pfund, 1980; Fuchsberg, 1989).

Entrepreneur!sm:
Membership characterized
by instrumental, calculative involvement.
The university is a tool to other ends.
Competition valued (Fuchsberg, 1989;
Krimsky, 1987; Etzkowitz, 1983).

Quality Control:
Integrity of peer re¬
view process - publication, openness,
faculty oversight (Krimsky, 1987;
Fuchsberg, 1989; Giamatti, 1983; Gibbons
& Wittrock, 1985).

Disinterestedness:
Critical/interpretive
function based on intellectual freedom.
Allegiance to knowledge alone.
Intellectual
and political autonomy essential.
Sensitive
to conflicts of interest (Krimsky, 1987;
Schaffer, 1989)

Reward Structure:
Sources of recognition
and status - based on market or academic
criteria?
Criteria for promotion
(Krimsky, 1987; Etzkowitz, 1989; Rule,
1988; Fuchsberg, 1989; Giamatti, 1983).
Recruitment of Faculty and Students:
(Etzkowitz, 1983; Krimsky, 1987; Prager
& Ommen, 1980; Minsky & Noble, 1989;
Reams, 1986).

Figure 3.1.

The Components of Discourse:

Traditionalist/Instrumentalist Literature
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A Conceptual Schema of the

End Notes
1. Steep entry costs effectively preclude small and medium-size
business - see Baer, 1978.
2. For a detailed description of the various forms these relation¬
ships take see the taxonomy developed by Nelkin and Nelson (1987).
3. This is not to subscribe to the claim that actors are entirely free
from the structure implicit in regularities and commonalities (see
Giddens, 1979; Ranson, Hinings & Greenwood, 1980; Manning, 1982;
Benson, 1983; Riley, 1983).
4. This claim is grounded in my deductive reading of relevant
literature.
The themes outlined in Figure 3.1 surfaced time and
again.
5. In his classic essay, "The Normative Structure of Science," Robert
Merton (1948) writes that the singular object of science, its raison
d'etre, is the "pursuit and diffusion of knowledge" (4).
Furthermore, the specialized methods and knowledge base that
distinguish the scientific enterprise rest upon a delicate web of
explicit and implicit understandings.
Merton describes how the
"Ethos of Science" is legitimated in the observance of four
conditions.
These conditions stipulate that scientific inquiry
should be: (1) neutral; (2) commonly owned (i.e., "ownership" is
limited to claims of intellectual authorship); (3) disinterested¬
ness; and (4) subject to detached scrutiny.
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CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH PROCEDURES:

Q METHODOLOGY -

OPERATIONALIZING SUBJECTIVITY

Only subjective opinions are at issue in Q, and although they are
typically improvable, they can nonetheless be shown to have structure
an<^ form, and it is the task of Q technique to render this form manifest
for purposes of observation and study.
Brown,

1986

Introduction
This research has three interrelated objectives.

One,

to survey

the perspectives of selected humanities and science faculty regarding
the current status of the social relations of academic research.
main,

In the

the Traditionalist/Instrumentalist debate represents the opinion

of leading academic scientists,
spokesmen.
effect,

university administrators,

Working faculty constitute the missing voice.

do various faculty draw their lines?

rendered by faculty are compared with (a)

Second,

corporate
Where,

in

the perspectives

the bipolar conceptual

dimension indexing the Traditionalist/Instrumentalist discourse and (b)
the competing ontologies shaping the concentric theoretical model
formulated in Chapter 2.

Are historians pure Traditionalists and

science faculty Instrumentalists?

Or, will faculty opinion organize

around mixed or altogether novel frames of reference?
in other words,

Do these models,

adequately describe the phenomena they purport to

represent?
And not least,

can a mechanism be found to represent the ontology

of organizational boundary?

For the exploratory purposes of this study,

will Q Methodology (Stephensen,
1988)

capture the variety,

1953;

Brown,

1980; McKeown & Thomas,

ambiguity and contradiction - as well as the
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regularity - purportedly endemic to the social relations of academic
work?
Since this project attempts to explore the frameworks of meaning
respective science and humanities faculty draw on to construct the
permissible limits of academic practice,
deserve special attention.

some methodological concerns

The empathic "in-the-other-person's-shoes"

axiom (Weber's verstehen sociology) behind all interpretive research
warrants method that is patient,
(Smircich,

1983),

and unobtrusive

sensitive to variety and ambiguity
(Brown,

1986).

In operative terms,

the investigator's operating hypotheses and method of choice must not
subordinate the subject's level of experience.

Otherwise, we chance

reducing the phenomenon of interest to the model's Procrustean
specifications

(Stephensen,

1983;

Daly,

1991) by "elevating the

imagination into the status of a universal legislator"

(Graff,

1979).

Given that the exploratory interest here is not to extend the range of
phenomena explicable in the analyst's terms so much as to map the
subjective terrain of meanings of a particular discourse, Q Methodology
seemed to bring an epistemological orientation and "operational
substance"

(Brown & Mathieson,

exploratory task (Stephenson,

1990) particularly suited for this
1953;

Brown,

1981; McKeown & Thomas,

1988).1

0 Methodology
Q Methodology (Q)

assumes from the very start that subjective

phenomena are not arbitrary nor intangible,
discernable form.

However,

but in possession of

the structure of subjective cognitive and

evaluative categories can be empirically known only if meanings are
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articulated in the respondents'
moreover,

terms.

Subjective meaning in Q,

is not free-floating and/or self-contained, but meaningful in

relation to social and intra-subjective environment.
phenomenological approaches,

unlike "R"

(Steele,

1979).

(Pearson's correlation R) method, Q

research does not take standardized statements
face value

as in other

the pieces of the jig-saw puzzle find

significance in relation to the whole
Accordingly,

In Q,

(e.g.,

scales,

traits) at

(that variables measure what they purport to measure), but

attempts to express a hermeneutic reconstruction.
not assumed analogous,

therefore,

by the investigator in absentia.

Subject response is

to the categorical meanings invented
For example,

the meaning of a disputed

term like "alienation" is not taken as fixed - equivalent,
(1986) puts it,

to a degree of Celsius.

as Brown

Fixed meanings are customary in

R because it is important to learn how much of a selected attribute
(authoritarianism,

liberalism,

alienation,

etc.)

someone has.

In Q,

the

subject's view on the matter comes first.
Meaning and measurement in Q,

therefore,

are not mediated as

material "things" external to and independent of the respondent.
contrary, Q assumes that "reality"

To the

is "caused" by individuals and not by

"variables" standing in for some external reality.

In a word,

research

categories in Q are not the a priori products of the investigator's
"arbitrary subjectivity," but made phenomenologically operant by
respondents communicating for themselves

(McKeown & Thomas,

1988).

Procedure
Data are gathered in Q Methodology by having subjects sort cards
containing words,

concepts,

statements or images being explored in the
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i-Tjectis assemr^e the various cards into piles according to
dr zvz sense cf similarity or difference with the contents on the
T£-

--

The result consists of distributions of cards codifying each

subject s

interpretation of the phenomenon being studied.

distributions

(i.e. .

sorts'*

In turn,

card

can be analyzed and compared along with the

s_d j ects thems eIves.
For this study a final Q sample of 66 statements was selected and
presented tc 31 faculty (14 historians and 17 polymer scientists and
engineers at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst) .
department chairmen and senior faculty,

Starting with

subjects were solicited for

their participation in this study through personal visits to various
faculty offices,

telephone calls,

and written memoranda.

The final

departmental cohorts represent an attempt to obtain roughly similar
dispersions of faculty by age,

gender and rank.

In the investigator's presence,
instructions to rank issue statements

all 31 subjects received identical
(each typed on a 3 X 5 card)

a forced choice continuum from "most like my point of view"
those "most unlike my point of view"

(-5).

(+5)

along

to

The resultant scale value

and requested number of cards per cell are shown in Figure 4.1, below:

Most Unlike

-5

-4

-3

-2

-1

Cards

(4)

(5)

(5)

(7)

(7)

0

+1

(10)(7)

+2

+3

+4

+5

Most Like

(7)

(5)

(5)

(4) per cell

Figure 4.1
Scale Values and Cards per Cell

Each subject was initially instructed to separate the entire deck
of statements into three piles:

those most like your point of view,

those most unlike your point of view and those statements with little
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psychological value

(Brown,

1972).

Respondents then selected four

statements from the "most like" pile and placed them in cell +5.

Each

subject then selected four cards from the "most unlike" pile and placed
them in the

-5 cell.

This was followed by selecting the next five "most

like" statements for cell +4 and so forth in a back-and-forth mode until
all 66 statements were situated along the opinion continuum.
To illustrate,

the resulting Q sort for one subject (number 8)

is

displayed in Figure 4.2, below:

Most Unlike

-5

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

+1

+2

+3

+4

+5

Card number

40
5
53
4

50
15
65
61
16

2
1
64
59
11

36
8
28
26
25
41
35
42

44
66
6
19
10
60
18
45

38
48
7
21
23
46
62
34

58
9
43
3
37
63
51

31
13
56
12
57
47
22

30
33
55
27
52

40
54
23
49
14

39
32
17
29

Most Like

Figure 4.2
Sample Q Sort

The 31 Q sorts were correlated producing a 31 x 31 correlation
matrix with coefficients indicating the degree of similarity between
each Q sort and all others.

The matrix was then factor-analyzed using

the principal components method.
(using varimax)

The factors extracted were rotated

to a position of simplest structure.

Q and R
A major stumbling block to comprehending the logic of Q is that
most of us have been trained to think in terms of the mechanics and
authority of "R".

Perhaps the theoretical orthogonality (not to be
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mistaken for bipolarity)

of Q and R can be effectively illustrated by

referring to the familiar linear correlation formula (Pedhazur,

1973):

Y - a + bx + E
where Y - the independent variable; X - the dependent variable;
- the Y intercept;

B(eta) - the regression coefficient;

a(lpha)

and E - random

disturbance or error term.
The epistemological gap differentiating Q from R becomes evident
if we examine the way each treats the E term.

Because achieving

statistical significance is accomplished by smoothing individual
differences of subjects in R,

(subjective) meaning is deemed

idiosyncratic and theoretically controlled by the error term.
respondent subjectivity amputated from context,

With

the error term in R acts

to signify methodological detachment as well as the privileged position
of the investigator's interpretive schema.

Indeed,

R validity and

reliability are grounded in the autonomous and self-referential
conditions symbolized by E.

In theory,

systematic variance is

"impartially" explained in R by isolating meaning from impersonal,

non-

contentious fact.
Q's relatively spacious,

discretionary logic can be disconcerting

particularly for those accustomed to thinking in R, because meaning is
not a problem in Q.

Rather than working to eliminate the E term,

Q

purposefully strives to make subjective significance the center of
theoretical and technical interest.

That is, Q (opinion)

work from different sets of data (Brown,

1985).

and R (fact)

Since Q validity hinges

on the context of the respondent's hermeneutic narrative rather than
"externally"

Imposed meanings, Q attempts to pry open the black box
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symbolized by E.

Because subjective rather than "objective" measures

are seminal in Q,

the investigator and respondent share epistemologic

authority.
In sum,

the Q analyst's objective is not to find phenomena that

neatly fit into preconceived conceptual categories for the purposes of
prediction and testing, but to locate and map a natural conceptual
topography.

The analyst and respondent in Q collaborate to preserve the

respondent's voice

("operationalizing" subjectivity)

in order to map the

aggregate mix of opinion constituting a particular "concourse"
(discourse)

of research interest (Brown,

1986).

Q's particular

contribution is its capacity to organize and reduce data in order to
clarify the underlying theoretical constructs that might be employed as
leading operational categories in subsequent descriptive or
correlational analyses

(Norusis,

1988),

or ethnographic research.

Although Q and R view the ontological status of phenomena from
quite different perspectives,

the investigator is not necessarily

trapped into an either/or choice.

It is perhaps more constructive to

think of Q as a source point for R (Brown,

1980).

In effect, Q

functions as a conceptual staging area generating heuristic leads for
the subsequent correlational or qualitative analyses that may follow.
If the meaning of the role and activities of research schools is
changing in the minds of interested parties,

then Q offers a systematic

empirical method midway between positivist and ideographic approaches
for surveying the new lines along which the reading of universities is
occurring.
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Considering that the concepts and mechanics of Q methodology may
be unfamiliar to some readers each of the technical steps outlined above
is discussed in more detail in the sections that follow.

Q Statements
To examine the competing contentions of the Traditionalists and
Instrumentalists,

a final representative sample of 66 Q statements was

drawn from over 400 statements derived from the investigator's deductive
reading of the literature

(see Figure 3.1).

included journal and newspaper articles,

Secondary source material

government publications, books,

and congressional testimony.
In light of the sheer volume of statements

(400+) harvested,

first priority was to trim this number down to practical size.

the

Many of

the original statements were redundant and consequently dropped.
Further reductions were achieved after a sample of the remaining
statements was cross-validated by two independent reviewers.

Statements

determined to be ambiguous or duplicative were eliminated.

Q-Sample Pretest
A

Q-sample of 79 statements was coded and printed on 3 x 5 cards

for pretesting.

Twelve graduate

departments of Economics,
participated.
a (-5)

(Ph.D)

students

(four each from the

History and Polymer Science & Engineering)

Subjects were instructed to sort the 79 statements along

"most unlike my point of view" to (+5)

view" choice continuum.

On average,

"most like my point of

students required about 70 minutes

to complete the 79 card Q-sort.
To examine how students were sorting,
Components factor analysis were performed;
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two iterations of Principal
once on the complete 12

subject sample and a second time with the four economic students
excluded.

(The economics students were dropped from the second analysis

because the final subject sample enlisted History and Polymer Science &
Engineering faculty only.)
The 12 subject analysis produced two factors with eigenvalues of
5.55 and 1.26.
variance.

These two factors accounted for a cumulative 56.8% of

Factors did not undergo substantive modification with

rotation indicating strong factor structures.

The eight subject sample

also produced two strong factors with eigenvalues of 3.60 and 1.11
respectively.

Cumulative variance explained rose to 59%.

The factor

structures for both analyses indicated that pretest subjects were not
sorting randomly.

In other words, the statements were sufficiently

meaningful for the test subjects to categorize statements in a
systematic manner.

Since the purpose of the Q statements is to elicit a

strong positive or negative response, statements consistently assigned
to low to neutral meaning cells eg.

-1, 0, and +1 were trimmed, reducing

the final Q-sort to 66 cards.
In the end,

the Q sample administered to the faculty sample

numbered 66 statements divided in near equal proportion between
Traditionalist (non-economic) and Instrumentalist (economic) attitudes.
In addition,

statements covered nine issue areas:

statements),

(2) intellectual property (11 statements),

entrepreneurism (6 statements),

(3) faculty

(4) disinterestedness (15 statements),

(5) project choice and work design (3 statements),
of work (2 statements),

(1) collectivity (2

(6) the organization

(7) quality control (4 statements),

(8) reward

system (2 statements), and (9) faculty and student recruitment (2
statements).

(Consult the schema of conceptual categories displayed in

62

Figure 3.1,

page 53).

A complete 66 card inventory of statements can be

found in Appendix B.
Statements representative of each main effect (the non-economic
[category 1]

and economic

[category 2]) as well as the normative and

structural sub-categories resonating from each were selected in
approximately equal numbers.

It was decided,

for example,

that the

following statement represented the University as a Non-Economic
Institution (classical Traditionalist in Figure 3.1):
Expensive, well-publicized corporate/university partnerships
are dangerous not only for the threats they pose to the
traditions of academic science, but because other
institutions will use these instances as "models" of the way
university-industry agreements ought to be.

The University as an Economic Institution (Instrumentalist in Figure
3.1)

orientation was reflected in the following example:
A more applied orientation will be good for American
university science, reducing the academic isolation that
developed during earlier postwar periods.

A Traditionalist Intellectual Property position is expressed in the
following statement:
The only "property rights" allowable for scientific
discoveries are the scientific honors and rewards that
derive from recognition of their originator.
Whereas,

an opposed (Instrumentalist)

Intellectual Property opinion

reads as follows:
Some infringements of the university's principle of free
dissemination of information should be allowed on a case by
case basis in order to protect the university's financial
interest.
Factor Analysis
Factor analysis in Q is a straightforward statistical exercise for
unearthing the various attitudinal groupings implicit in the correlation
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matrix.
i.e.,

Each factor in Q represents a category of operant subjectivity;

persons significantly associated ("loaded") with a given factor

are assumed to share a common outlook.

Thus,

an individual's positive

loading on a factor indicates his or her shared subjectivity with others
on that factor.

Conversely,

the factor's perspective.

negative loadings are signs of rejection of

The portfolio of factors that ultimately

emerges depends on how divided an audience is on a particular issue.

Factor Interpretation
The previous steps are requisite "to prepare(ing) phenomena so
that they can display their structure"

(Brown,

1985:

115).

And this

implicit structure resides in the "patterned relationships" of
statements made operant by individuals performing Q sorts.
then,

represents a generalized attitude or Gestalt or,

Each factor,

as in this case,

a general conception of "the ethos of academic life" held in common by
the persons grouped by factor.
While it is axiomatic that "order" precede "meaning" in Q, Q
factors never lose their "fundamentally operant" and provocative nature.
Unlike R,

therefore,

the process of factor interpretation,

commences

only after factors surface and remains open to further testing and
reevaluation (Brown,
With Q,

1986).

factor descriptions and interpretations are based

primarily on factor scores
1988).

(and factor loadings)

(McKeown & Thomas,

Examining the factor scores of selected statement items across

factors assists in the search for the basic themes distinguishing the
internal perspectives of important factors.

To facilitate this process,

the factor scores assigned to each individual statement are merged into
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distinct factor arrays which function as composite Q-sorts for each
factor.

Arrays are typically placed side by side for viewing and

analysis.

Differences and similarities in factor scores by statement

item provide the basis for description and theorizing (Brown,
Factor scores were calculated in standard (Z)

score units for each

of the 66 statements and then arrayed in columns by factor.
convenience Z scores were converted into whole numbers
...+4,

+5)

1980).

(-5,

For
-4,

-3,

-4

to simplify comparisons of the thematic content of different

factor arrays.

For illustrative purposes,

partial arrays are shown in

Table 4.1 below.
Table 4.1
Examples of Statement Factor Scores Arrayed by Factor2

Statement #

Factor A Scores

Factor B Scores

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

+1
+2
+3
+3
+2
+1
+1
+3
+1
+2

-1
-1
+5
0
-1
+2
+2
+1
+4
0

66

+5

+3

Table 4.1 table shows the composite factor scores for the Qstatements shown.

Statement 1,

interest in either factor.
stronger responses

for example,

Statement 3,

(+3 and +5).

failed to excite subject

on the other hand,

induced

Every statement for each factor's
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composite array is scored in this manner making intra- and inter-factor
comparisons possible.

P-Sample
The selection of appropriate questions and subjects constitutes
the two most important procedural aspects of any Q study.

Since the

exploratory purpose of Q research is not concerned with assigning
subjects to predetermined categories, but mapping the typology of
opinion implicit in the communication discourse in question,
randomness nor large sample size are material.
of person (P)

neither

The size and composition

samples is governed exclusively by pragmatic and

theoretical concerns

(McKeown & Thomas,

1988).

In light of the binary theoretical dimensions segmenting the
literature,
members,

subjects were recruited from two disciplines

(History - 14

and Polymer Science & Engineering - 17 members) hypothesized to

represent bipolar opinions

(humanities vs. hard science) concerning

university/industry relations.
is not new,

of course.

The idea of a science/humanities break

In his influential book,

the Scientific Revolution (1959),

C.

P.

The Two Cultures and

Snow describes university

environments as consisting of two powerful sub-cultures - one occupied
by scientists and the other by literary intellectuals.
world in radically different terms,
other.

Weber,

spheres

-

Richard J.

too,

science,

Viewing the

each remains isolated from the

partitioned the cultural world into three distinct
morality (eg.,

Bernstein (ed.),

In other words,

law and medicine),

and art.

[See

Habermas and Modernity (1985).]

the intention here was to examine the major

conceptual features of the Traditionalist/Instrumentalist antithesis and
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organizational theory with faculty operating at the boundary,

i.e.,

those whose work required regular and extensive contact with industry
(polymer scientists), and another set nearer to the "core",

i.e.,

faculty with virtually no market exposure at all (historians).
Although it might be perceived otherwise by readers accustomed to
random sampling modes,

this qualitative (nonrandom) sampling strategy

actually entails no assurance that Traditionalist and Instrumentalist
positions would materialize as hypothesized.

On the contrary, like

other forms of inquiry, results could not be controlled for (known) in
advance, only conceptually anticipated.

Logic anticipated different

perspectives, but the risk of coming up (empirically) empty handed was
real. For example,
been incomplete.

the analytic reading of the literature might have
Or, even if our deductive analysis of the

Traditionalist/Instrumentalist literature was acknowledged as valid
there was no way to know in advance if faculty constituted their world
in Traditionalist/Instrumentalist terms.

Everything considered,

sampling faculty from the alleged classical intellectual divide embodied
in the humanities and the hard sciences seemed to constitute a
reasonable test.

Participants were also asked to complete a brief

background questionnaire.

Some of these demographic data appear later.

The Two Departments and Their Relations with Industry
Both departments are recognized in their respective fields.

The

History department dates back to the university's founding in 1863 and
currently hosts 40 full-time tenured or tenure track members.

Faculty

engage in teaching and research in a variety of areas including Ancient,
Middle Eastern, and Latin and North American history, Labor Studies,
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Black and Feminist history,

studies in Western Technology, etc.

Departmental (salary) expenditures amounted to $1,919,121 for FY 1990
(source: Dept, of History).

The department received one direct

(humanities) foundation grant for $1469 in FY 1991 (source: Office of
Grants and Contracts).

Not unexpectedly,

the faculty surveyed in this

study hold no patents, with one exception do not advise industry (and
not for profit); and besides book royalties, derive no direct monetary
support from industry.
If the History department is unique for its low level of grant
support,

the Polymer Science and Engineering Program functions in a

radically different arena.

Launched as a modest graduate program in

1967, the PSE Department expanded into a university department in 1974.
Currently, PSE operates with 13 full time and several adjunct
interdisciplinary faculty with over 150 graduate students and visiting
scientists in residence (Polymer Symposium. May 16,

1991).

Research

experience in industry for senior faculty averaged seven years.

Over 50

companies and several government agencies support research and advanced
degree programs.

In FY 90-91 the department received a little under $1M

(salaries) from the state and $7,571,200 in direct and indirect grants
from the National Science Foundation (24%), Department of Defense
(39.4%) and industry (36.6%)
addition,

(Polymer Symposium. May 16, 1991).

the department signed a three-year,

In

$1,200,000 research

contract with AKZO America and a $2M five-year deal with IBM.

PSE will

officially come of age when it moves to its new $57M,

160,000 square

foot headquarters,

in April, 1994.

the Conte Polymer Research Center,

Over and above state support,

the department maintains six major

funding programs for underwriting its research and teaching activities.
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The Center for UMass-Industry Research on Polymers (CUMIRP) is the most
prominent of these programs and of particular interest to this research
- 16 of the 17 scientists surveyed are active members of CUMIRP.
Inaugurated in September,

1980, under the NSF Industry-University

Cooperative Research Center Program,

the official goal of CUMIRP "is to

develop a sound research base in key areas of polymer science of
interest to industry participants" (Graduate Program in Polymer Science
& Engineering.

1989).

Twelve industry and two government agencies

underwrite CUMIRP research.
$40,000 per year.

Membership fees are currently fixed at

Recent sponsors included AKZO, American Cyanamid,

Hoeschst-Celanese, Dow, DuPont, Eastman Kodak Co., General Electric,
IBM, Olin, Rohm & Haas, Army Laboratories, Natick and Watertown, Mass.,
and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, Calif.
National Science Foundation is a member on a continuing basis.
addition,

The

In

the NSF contributes another $93,000 in support of four smaller

projects boosting the total 1990-91 CUMIRP budget to $693,000
(conversation with Dr. S. W. Kantor, Director, CUMIRP).
budget projection is $823,200.
obstacles.

At this time,

(However,

The 1991-92

this estimate faces some

12 contracts are slated for renewal.

In

addition, one company recently cancelled its membership as part of a
cost-cutting effort.)
CUMIRP membership entitles sponsors to non-exclusive,
U.S. and foreign licenses to CUMIRP inventions.
the property of the university, however.

royalty-free

Patent rights remain

Participating faculty have the

right to publish in scientific journals, but sponsors may review
manuscripts beforehand.

Although no patents have been filed to date,

sponsors interested in filing patent claims may delay publication up to
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one year.

Ax\ Advisory Board composed of members fro« indust iv and the

University meets semi-annually to decide and approve policy and \e*ea\ch
projects.

Facultv ?enccrarhcs
The faculty sample comprised thirty-one (31) full-time faculty at
the University of Massachusetts, Amherst - 14 History faculty and 1/
members of the Polymer Science and Engineering department.
of the faculty sampled was 49 years (32 to 69 years).

The mean a^e

Research and

teaching experience averaged 16.5 years (1 to 40 years).

Twenty-tom

(24) faculty were tenured (associate rank or senior).
The 14 history faculty averaged 48.5 years of age and 16.7 years
of teaching and research experience.
women.

Nine faculty were tenured.

Five faculty in this group were
No subject in the history cohort had

filed for a patent claim, had sat on a corporate advisory board, or had
received any research support from industry during their academic
careers.
On average, polymer science subjects were likely to be 49 years
old with 16.2 years of academic experience.
seventeen (17) were tenured.

Fifteen (15) out of

There were no women faculty in the

department at the time of this study.

Seven faculty owned patents,

ten

had or were currently sitting on corporate advisory boards, and 37.5 per
cent of this cohort's research and teaching activities was underwritten
by industry.

Industrial research experience for the most senior faculty

averaged seven years.
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End Notes
1.

In addition, the charged atmosphere surrounding the issue of
university-industry relations also influenced our choice of
methodology.
If possible, we wanted to avoid the complaint of
self-reporting bias clouding the credibility of earlier
questionnaire research (see Krimsky, Ennis, & Weissman, 1991).
As
compared to these approaches, the process of Q-sorting seems to
provide subjects with the requisite level of privacy and anonymity
for dealing with sensitive subject matter.

2.

The factor scores are the same scale numbers as they appear in the
forced choice continuum organizing every Q sort, i.e.,
Most Unlike -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 Most Like.
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CHAPTER 5

RESEARCH RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
The factors in Q methodology are categories of operant
suh iectivity (Stephenson, 1977) that were inherent in the concourse
originally, for it was these separate attitudes (the existence of which
the factor analysis demonstrates) that gave rise to all the conversation
initially.
What begins as subjective communicability, therefore, is
prepared for viewing through "the midwifery of Q methodology," as
Barchak (1984: 118) has nicely put it, and is eventually manifested as
operant factors, which, in turn, display the form and structure of the
communicability at issue.

Brown (1986)
Introduction
Q methodology assumes that underlying subjective structures can be
made manifest or "operant" by providing respondents an unobtrusive
medium to model their respective points of view.

Accordingly,

faculty

Q-sorts are analyzed in this chapter in an attempt to literally
visualize how faculty "see" their organizational experiences firsthand.
Following the procedure outlined in the previous chapter,

31 faculty

subjects modelled their subjectivity by rank ordering (Q-sorting) 66
statements along a continuum of interest.

All 31 Q-sorts were

intercorrelated resulting in a 31 x 31 correlation matrix.

Factor

analysis was then carried out.
The factor solution produced two major factors, A and B - two
distinct (uncorrelated) clusters of opinion with 17 respondents
significantly identified with one factor or the other (see Tables 5.1
and 5.2).

Each stood out with regard to relative eigenvalue scores,

variance explained and variable (subject) size.

Both factors A and B

displayed eigenvalues (EV) well in excess of the conventional threshold
of 1.00,

ie., EV - 8.046 and 6.58, respectively.
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In addition,

factor A

Table 5.1
Factor Loadings and Subjects
(H - Historian; P - Polymer Scientist/Engineer)

Factor

A

Subj ect

EV =
%Variance

H12
H14
HI
H5
H4
H6
H9
H2
H10
Hll

B
.867
.854
.799
.791
.777
.768
.739
.636
.636
.592

P17
P16
P10
P4
P6
P9
P14

8 .05
26

Factor

EV %Variance

H3
H13

.751
.722
.698
.636
.604
.516
.418

P8
.856
P15 .472

1.64
5.3

1.58
5.1

G
.814
.568

P13
P5

1 .17
3.8

D

PI
.720
H7
.691
P12 .652

6 .58
21

F

Subject

C

E
P2
.698
Pll .670
P3
.545

1.28
4.1

H
.722
.574

H8
.683
P7 -.392

1 .06
3.4

1.03
3.3

accounted for twenty-six (26) percent of total variability explained.
Factor B accounted for 21 percent for a cumulative percentage of 47.2
percent.

Factor loadings for each factor are significant at the 0.01

level.1
Even at this early juncture the factor analysis yields four
tentative leads.

One,

the two principal factors, A and B, are split

along departmental lines.

A plurality of historians and polymer

scientists and engineers have Q-sorted orthogonal perspectives.

Second,

the appearance of composite (homeless) subjects such as P14 and P7 as
well as the six residual factors signals the possibility of categories
other than the pure,

two-dimensional (Traditionalist/Instrumentalist)

types featured in the literature.

(Subject P14 loads virtually equally
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Cu

OO

Cu

on factor A (.39) and factor B (.42).

P7 displays equivalent

associations across factors A (.37), C (.34), D (.34).)
other things,

Third, among

the presence of the six residual factors demonstrates the

presence of within-discipline divisions (i.e., not all historians think
alike).

And last, generation, and gender, have emerged as possible

issues for future inquiry.

(For more commentary regarding gender and

generation turn to Appendix D.)

Interpretation
The analyst works with many degrees of freedom in Q Methodology.
As Brown (1985:

113) explains, Q is:

...expressly devoid of normative presumptions, and hence
there is no standard set of Q items for any study, no
standardized statements, no standard number of statements,
no fixed number of factors, no fixed algorithm for factor
rotation (e.g., varimax), and no standard distribution.
The same degree of flexibility applies to factor interpretation as well.
If the analysis is to accomplish more than mere description,

the

investigator has to be prepared to slip into the respondents' shoes
(Brown,

1989).

"Empathy” is achieved when the investigator learns to

think what the Q-sorters were thinking and in their terms.
Typically,

the literature provides no clear criteria for gaining

hermeneutic entrance.
her own.

The investigator is essentially left on his or

If the Q literature provides any clue at all it is that

analysts customarily attack the problem of interpretation in part or all
of the following ways.
accomplish,

Depending on what the investigator is trying to

inferences can be drawn from consensual or negatively

consensual statements (Vajirakachorn & Sylvia,
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[1990]),

from statements

located at the extremes of composite Q-sort distributions (the
statements found under the +5 and -5 cells)

(Brown & Mathieson [1990]),

by scanning for comparisons across factor arrays (Patterson, 1982), or,
as we have decided to do here, by employing all of these strategies.
Brown (1986) customarily embarks on his interpretive process by
applying Stephenson's (1983) "Sontag" rule.

He spreads every statement

constituting each factor's composite attitude (Q-sort) out for viewing
and then strives to "see more, hear more, feel more" of what each factor
expresses before deliberately interpreting the impressions that emerge
from this intuitive process.

We will honor his example with a

preliminary visual survey of the entire (66 card) Q-sort distribution.
However, not unmindful of the general interpretive context rendered in
the 66 card display, we find the thought of grappling with the entire
deck visually and analytically overwhelming.

We risk missing something

important.
We propose that a richer understanding can be gained by
subdividing the deck into more manageable-sized categories.

The cards

in each category are then organized into display maps for purposes of
visualization and interpretation.
in an incremental manner.

Indeed, most Q investigators proceed

Only in this instance we intend to rake

through the data a little more finely and incrementally than most.
as Brown claims (1986),
hopefully,

seeing precedes hearing and feeling,

If,

then

the extraordinary emphasis on visual mapping used here will

create a window to the patterns implicit in the data,
them visible.

So,

thus rendering

following Brown's (1986) recommendation,

the

respective Q-sorts for Factors A and B are arrayed in Tables 5.3 and
5.4.
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Table

5.32

Distribution of Factor A Statements
(Historians Only)

Most Unlike
-5
-4
2.6

3.9
4.8
6.3
11.1

-3
2.9
4.2
4.6
5.4
7.1

-2

-1

3.10
2.2
3.14 2.5
3.16
2.11
4.4
2.14
3.5
4.7
4.10
3.11
4.15
5.1
6.2
10.2
9.1

0
2.10
4.1
5.11
9.3

+1

+2

+3

1.1
1.6
1.7
1.9
2.3
3.2
3.13
3.17
9.5

1.2
1.5
1.10
3.7
3.8
4.3
5.7
5.9
7.2
7.4

1.3
1.4
1.8
1.11
3.4
3.12
3.15
4.5
5.5
8.5
10.5

Most Like
+4
+5
3.6
9.7

4.9
8.3
11.2

Table 5.4
Distribution of Factor B Statements3
(Polymer Scientists Only)

Most Unlike
-5
-4
11.1

-3
2.6
4.6

-2
3.17
4.1
9.1
10.2

-1
1.1
1.2
1.5
3.7
5.9
9.7

0

+1

1.4
1.10
1.11
2.2
7.4
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1.8
3.8
3.9
5.1
6.3
9.5
10.5

+2

+3

1.6
1.7
2.9
4.2
4.5
4.9
8.5
9.3

2.11
3.4
3.6
3.10
3.13
3.14
3.16
4.3
11.2

Most Like
+4
+5
1.9
2.3
3.12
4.15
5.4
7.2

1.3
2.5
2.10
2.14
3.2
3.5
3.11
3.15
4.4
4.7
4.8
4.10
5.5
5.7
5.11
6.2
7.1
8.3

Discussion of Complete (66) Card Distributions bv Major Factors A & R
What do these patterns initially suggest?

Broadly speaking, the

composite configurations of card placements for each factor show that
Factor A statements are fairly evenly divided between negative and
positive attributions; whereas, Factor B statement placement is heavily
skewed toward the positive ("most like") side of the sort.
+5 cell in Factor B contains 18 statement items,
the other cells in that factor.
contains only three items.

Indeed, the

twice as many as any of

By comparison, the +5 cell in Factor A

As a group,

the historians (Factor A) placed

a total of five cards in cells +4 and +5, while the polymer scientists
placed nearly five times as many or 24.

If the most polar cells are

indicators of the level of respondent interest then these different
patterns suggest that the polymer scientists are more strongly moved by
the cards on the whole than their historian counterparts.

Perhaps the

historians' relatively cool response is due to the fact that their
concerns are different or not as immediate as the polymer science
faculty.

Indeed, after sorting statements some historians commented

that they placed a large number of statements in the -1, 0, and +1 cells
because many of the issues in the Q-sample were unfamiliar to them.
Are there any clues regarding Traditionalist or Instrumentalist
values to be found in these sorts?

Leaving the analysis of the

statement contents until later, let's try to facilitate visualization of
tentative patterns by purging each composite Q-sort of everything but
two categories of statements - non-economic (Traditionalist) items
(coded category 1) and economic (Instrumentalist) items (category 2) and
"see" what comes to mind (Tables 5.5 and 5.6).
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Table 5.5
Distribution of Non-Economic (Category 1) - "Traditionalist" and
Economic - "Instrumentalist" (Category 2) Statements in Factor A
(Historians)

Most Unlike
-4
-5
2.6

-3

-2

2.9

-1

0

2.2
2.10
2.5
2.11
2.14

+1

+2

+3

1.1
1.6
1.7
1.9
2.3

1.2
1.5
1.10

1.3
1.4
1.8
1.11

Most Like
+4
+5

Table 5.6
Distribution of Non-Economic (Category 1) - "Traditionalist" and
Economic (Category 2) - "Instrumentalist" Statements in Factor B
(Polymer Scientists)

Most Unlike
-3
2.6

-2

-1
1.1
1.2

0
1.4
1.10
1.11
2.2

+1

+2

+3

1.8

1.6
1.7
2.9

2.11

Most Like
+4
+5
1.9
2.3

1.3
2.5
2.10
2.14

Discussion of Category 1 and Category
2 Statement Distributions by Faculty Cohorts
The distribution of category 1 and category 2 statements should
provide a provisional index of how strongly "Traditional" or
"Instrumental" each factor is weighted.

First notice that all of the

category 1 statements in Factor A are situated to the right of "0" or in
the positive spectrum of that factor.

All the category 2 statements,

conversely, are located to the left of zero (save for one item at the
midpoint [2.10] and another under the +1 cell [2.3]).

Moreover, the

Traditionalist statements (category 1) are concentrated in cells +1
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through +3.

Interestingly, cells +4 and +5 are vacant.

This may

indicate that the sample of history faculty is not as firmly wedded to
Traditionalist values as originally hypothesized.
factor (Factor B) Q-sort is also provocative.

The modified polymer

For example, cards from

both categories are virtually evenly divided (five category 1 items and
six category 2 items) between cell +1 to cell +5, although twice as many
category 2 items (four to two) are found in the +4 and +5 cells.
shown,

As

five category 1 statements occupy the 0 and -1 cells and one

outlying category 2 item languishes in the -3 cell.

Again without

having examined any statement contents, this pattern may suggest a
significant degree of ambivalence.

Although the polymer scientists in

Factor B lean toward the Instrumentalist perspective,

they seem to

represent a value mix rather than a pure type.
What do these first impressions suggest?
level, at least,
ambivalence.

At this superficial

the Q instrument appears sensitive to variety and

That is,

it demonstrates,

if only tentatively at this

point, a capacity to probe beneath crude univocal categories.

Second,

the preliminary findings hint that historian and polymer science cohorts
operate with different value systems.

Third,

the possible presence of a

diversity of academic norms and values weakens the unitary (structural¬
ist) theory of organization assumed in the Traditionalist and
Instrumentalist literatures.

Indeed,

the discovery of two orthogonal

factors clearly indicates that faculty do not speak with one voice on
these issues.
Some areas of agreement exist, however.

For example, both factors

pay tribute to several Mertonian norms (category 1 statements) and
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reject statement 2.6.

Perhaps these (departmental) distributions

suggest that while "Traditionalist" and "Instrumentalist" categories may
exist,

they are more complex than the literature allows for.
Before considering factors A and B individually,

it may be

instructive to examine the opinions common to both factors - those 16
statements that gained essentially the same score across both factors.4
Let's examine the most positively consensual statements along with their
factor scores arranged from the most positively salient down (Table
5.7).
Table 5.7
Distribution of positively consensual statements in
Factors A and B (Factor A statements in parens)

Most Unlike
-5
-4

-3

-2

+1
(1.6)
(1.7)
3.8

+2

+3

Most Like
+4

1.6
1.7
(3.8)

3.4
3.6
(3.6)
(3.12) 3.12
(4.3)
4.3
4.5
(4.5)
8.5
(8.5)

9.5
(9.5)

8.3
(8.3)

List of Positively Consensual Statements with Factor Scores
8.3

3.6

Market forces have always been a part of the shifts
among posts in U.S. academia, but now the scale has
dramatically altered their significance.
These
have created rifts within the faculties of each
institution; the humanities and social science
faculties often feel that they are being neglected.
The pattern of collaboration between large universities and large corporations may be a familiar
one.
But the implications for the use of taxpayers'
funds and the danger of conflicts of interest that
these agreements raise require renewed evaluation.
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Scores
A
+5

B
+5

+4

+3

3.12

Universities should also be worried about "conflicts of commitment" - situations where faculty
members neglect their academic duties in favor of
pursuing other activities, such as consulting
outside the university.

+3

+4

3.4

Scientists who shift their attention to the
economic benefits of research or who hold equity
in firms that market scientific discoveries cannot,
at the same time, serve society as disinterested
experts on the impacts of the new scientific
technologies.

+3

+3

4.3

The unwillingness of academic researchers supported
by industry to make research results public will
slow the research process of colleagues.

+2

+3

4.5

Science is nourished by free and open exchanges
of information.
There is no place for proprietary
knowledge in the academy.

+3

+2

8.5

There are bound to be adverse consequences in terms
of collaboration among faculty in various depart¬
ments if one group must worry about protecting
corporate rights to licenses.

+3

+2

1.6

The question for the '90s is whether universities
are to be public-sector institutions spending
public money or private-sector institutions
supported with public money.

+1

+2

1.7

It's always a mistake to reduce support for fundamental science in order to address things you may
think have more immediate applications.

+1

+2

3.8

Researchers should pledge that, while a study is
in progress, they will not hold stock in the
companies making or distributing the products
being evaluated.

+2

+1

9.5

Given industry's investment in university research,
it's not surprising that industry should want to
extend its control into the "untouchable" area of
peer review.

+1

+1

Discussion of Positively Consensual Statements
Notice that each of these statements endorses the non-economic
values of classical, Mertonian science - disinterestedness (3.8,
3.12), free exchange (4.3, 4.5),

3.4,

the pre-eminence of a collective ethos
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(8.5,

8.3).

But these statements also carry an undertone of concern -

of trespass? - that orthodox values are at risk of being overrun by
antithetical market values (8.3,

3.6,

9.5).

Both factors seem to share

a concern about the emphasis of current events.
on market priorities,

Will too much emphasis

for example, result in a deemphasis on basic

research (1.7), deepen the alleged rift between science and humanities
faculty (8.3) and even immediate colleagues (8.5)?

Is the seminal

principle of free-sharing going to be respected?

The uncompromising

tone found in some of statements (4.5, 1.7, 3.12,

8.5) could be taken as

an indication of how serious the situation is perceived to be.
market,
8.3).
8.3,

The

for example, constitutes a force that recognizes no limits (9.5,
The boundaries defining the roles of faculty (3.6,

3.4,

3.8, 3.12,

9.5) and the fundamental purpose of the university (1.6)

itself have become porous and fuzzy.
As shown in Table 5.8, similar inferences can be drawn on the
basis of those statements achieving a negative consensus.
Table 5.8
Distribution of Negatively Consensual Statements in Factors A and B

Most Unlike
-5
-4
(11.1) 11.1

-3

-2

(4.6)
4.6

(9.1)
9.1

10.2

-1

0

+1

+2

+3

Most Like
+4
+5

(10.2)

List of Negatively Consensual Statements with Factor Scores
11.1

Where large investments are involved,companies should
have the right to review faculty appointments.

Scores
-4
-5

4.6

Free and open exchanges in science that threaten
industrial leadership are justifiably controlled.

-3

84

-3

9.1

10.2

Too much weight is given to the role of peer-reviewed
journals in the process of scientific communication.
Science doesn't not exist until it is published.

-2

-2

Policy concerning university-industry relations
should be set and resolved at the department level.

-1

-2

Discussion of Negatively Consensual Card Distribution
On the whole,

these statements do nothing to contradict the themes

drawn from the positively consensual items.
encroachment and boundary crop up again.
faculty, not business operatives,

The implicit issues of

Specifically,

it is up to

to determine access to academic

membership and information (11.1, 4.6).

Although the emphasis is

weaker, quality control (9.1) is also an exclusively academic matter.
These exigent statements send off caution signals like a blinking yellow
light.

They attempt to firm up lines.

They also "feel" defensive,

thrown up as roadblocks to prevent something undesirable from occurring.
Now that we have observed what the factors share in common,
attention shifts to the meanings contained in the context of the 24
statements which discriminate most between factors (Table 5.9, p. 86).
Card codes bracketed within parentheses signify factor A historians.

Discussion of Meaningfully Differentiated Statements
Observe that all but two of factor A's (historians) scores are
found to the left of the zero cell.
6.3,

And only three statements (4.8,

9.7) are shown to have earned high positive or negative scores.

Conversely, only one factor B (polymer scientists and engineers) score
displays even a slight negative valence.

Polymer scientists, moreover,

allocated fifteen (15) statements to the +5 cell.

The relative location

of statements suggests that factor A historians regard the subject
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Table 5.9
Distribution of Statement Items with Score Differentials
of 4 or More by Factor
(Factor A Historians in Parens)

Most Unlike
-5
-4

-3

-2

-1

0

+1

+2

+3

Most Like
+4
+5

(2.5)

2.5

(2.9)

2.9
(2.10)
(2.11)
(2.14)

2.10
2.11
2.14
3.2
3.5

(3.2)
(3.5)
(3.10)

3.10
(3.11)

3.11

(3.14)
(3.16)

3.14
3.16

(4.2)

4.2
(4.4)
(4.7)

4.4
4.7
4.8
4.10

(4.8)
(4.10)
(4.15)

4.15
5.4

(5.4)

5.11
6.2

(5.11)
(6.2)
(6.3)

6.3
(7.1)

7.1
9.7

(9.7)

matter configured here far less enthusiastically than their factor B
counterparts.
absent.

This statement map is also significant because of what is

It would appear that historians and scientists have no

fundamental disagreement over the Traditionalist values featured in
category 1 (the university as a non-market phenomenon) statements.
It might help to simplify the interpretive process once again by
focusing on each major subject category in Table 5.9 (the university as
an economic entity, disinterestedness/autonomy,
intellectual property) in turn.
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the treatment of

Table 5.10
Distribution of Category 2 (the university as an economic
entity) Statements by Factors (Historians in parens)

Most Unlike
-5
-4

-3

-2

-1

0

+1

+2

+3

Most Like
+4
+5

(2.5)

2.5

(2.9)

2.9
(2.10)

2.10

(2.11)
(2.14)

2.11
2.14

Listing of Category 2 Statements with Factor Scores
2.5

The claims made by critics of university-industry
ties exaggerate the negative impacts and neglect
the reciprocal benefits to both institutions.

2.9 The scientific process is essentially selfcorrecting, and more research money, not
management, is all that is needed to rectify
abuses of the past.

Scores
A
-1

B
+5

-3

+2

0

+5

-1

+3

-1

+5

2.10 More industrial support induces wider scientific
participation, which in turn elevates the level
of cross-collaboration, which is what ultimately
moves science ahead.
2.11 The effects of industry funding of universities
are no different from those of government funding.
2.14

A more applied orientation will be good for
American university science, reducing the academic
isolation that developed during earlier postwar
periods.

Discussion of Category 2 Statement Distribution
The distribution of category 2 statements suggests that factor A
historians and factor B polymer scientists/engineers are at odds over
the implications of industry funding of academic science.

Historians in

this case seem to perceive corporate support as different (2.11),
vaguely foreign and possibly harmful
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(2.5).

This orientation begins to

explain the hedging by historians alluded to earlier in Table 5.6.
Perhaps motivated by more utilitarian concerns

(2.14),

factor B polymer

scientists/engineers view the issue of corporate funding in a more
optimistic light (2.5,
scientists,

2.10,

In the collective eye of factor B

the benefits of industry/university collaboration appear to

outweigh the drawbacks
new concerns

2.11).

(2.11).

(2.5).
Indeed,

Industry money really does not pose any
these arrangements foster and promote

intellectual cross-fertilization (2.10) while enlarging the role of
university science

(2.14).

Perhaps most revealing,

for the first time we are briefly exposed

to different thinking about scientific epistemology.

Does the

enthusiasm evinced by polymer scientists stem from a belief in a
socially neutral,

essentialist science

(2.9)?

If this is the case, why

worry about the university's alliances if scientific processes are selfadjusting (2.9)?

By extension,

evidently factor A historians don't

share this optimistic idea of contextual isolation, but rather deem
scientific action as culturally vulnerable.

Perhaps historians hesitate

because they believe traditions to be fragile.

Table 5.11
Distribution of Category 3 (academic disinterestedness)
Statements by Factor (Factor A historians in parens)

Most Like
-5
-4

-3

-2

-1

+1

0

+2

+3

Most Unlike
+4
+5
3.2

(3.2)
3.5

(3.5)
(3.10)

3.10
3.11

(3.11)
3.14
3.16

(3.14)
(3.16)

88

Listing of Category 3 Statements with Factor Scores
3.2

3.5

3.10

3.11

3.14

3.16

Limits should be placed on how much time faculty
can devote to outside concerns.
The one-fifth
rule allowing one day per week is fair and
adequate.

Scores
A

B

+1

+5

Conflicts of interest can be minimized or avoided
altogether by vigilance and good faith.

-1

+5

Universities are very much aware of complex
issues like conflict of interest involved in
technology-transfer activities and are
dealing with them.

-2

+3

As long as I don't have controlling interest
in a company, my personal financial information
is a private affair, irrelevant to my research.

-1

+5

It's a shame that the whole issue of disclosure
and divestiture is based on the assumption that
financial rewards affect a researcher's work.

-2

+3

There is nothing improper with companies paying
for trips to scientific meetings and paying
university scientists to talk at those meetings
about topics related to the company's products.

-2

+3

Discussion of Category 3 Statement Distribution
The historians and polymer scientists/engineers comprising factors
A and B apparently maintain different viewpoints of what it is to be
"disinterested.”

"Disinterestedness" or intellectual autonomy is

defined in the Traditionalist (Mertonian)
that is free of any extraneous obligation.

sense as intellectual work
Scientific interest serves

no other master, but is ideally motivated for its own sake
1987).

(Richards,

Breaches of this alleged institutional neutrality constitute

conflicts of interest.
The six statements in dispute here seem to imply that historians
and polymer scientists/engineers define conflicted interest differently.
Factor A historians,

for example,

appear to believe that conflicts of
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interest should receive more serious consideration (3.5,

3.10).

Hopeful

expressions of good faith and the enforcement of "one fifth" rules are
in themselves not enough to insure the intellectual freedom of academic
work.

Academicians possess no special immunity from "external"

influences

(3.14).

There is an unspoken suggestion that stricter

definitions and enforcements are in order.
Factor B polymer scientists/engineers,

on the other hand,

apparently reduce the issue to the level of individual probity (3.5,
3.14).

Conflicts of interest stem from a class of individual conduct

rather than a structural one.
practices in good faith,
(3.5).

As a result,

fears to go

(3.14).

If one is aware of the pitfalls and

conflict of interest should not be a concern

the polymer scientist treads where the historian
For example,

one's personal finances,

relationships

with industry and honorarium should not be problematic for the
sophisticated scientist (3.11,

3.16).

Perhaps this confidence may be

attributed again to a particular definition of science as a cognitive
dimension safely removed from the everyday importunities and compromises
endemic to the "outside" world.
traditional safeguards

(3.2),

It follows,

then,

that,

excepting

no need exists for outside meddling in the

private affairs of individual scientists

(3.5,

3.10,

3.11).

In the end,

the definition of conflicted interests is properly left to the
discretion of the individual scientist (3.11,

3.14,

3.16).

This interpretation implies that historians and scientists use
different levels of analysis.

It seems that historians prefer to

interpret phenomena at the cultural/sociological level while polymer
scientists emphasize the micro-analytic.

Is social imperative or the

heroic authority of the individual the ultimate locus of action?
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These

concerns readily translate into issues of power,

of course.

to the expanding regulatory prerogative of outside agencies,

Sensitive
is the

scientist's principal concern to stake out inviolate territory?
meantime,

stymied by this conceptual inconsistency,

conflicted interest goes begging.

For example,

In the

a definition of

do questions of conflict

properly extend beyond curiosity/motivation to include project design,
methodology and the overall direction of scientific activity?

Table 5.12
Distribution of Category 4 (Intellectual Property) Statements
by Factor (Factor A historians in parens)

Most Unlike
-5
-4

-3

-2

-1

0

+1

(4.2)

+2

+3

Most Like
+4
+5

4.2
(4.4)
(4.7)

4.4
4.7
4.8
4.10

(4.8)
(4.10)
(4.15)

4.15

Listing of Category 4 Statements with Factor Scores
4.2

Some infringements of the university's principle
Scores
of free dissemination of information should be
A
B
allowed on a case by case basis in order to protect
the university's financial interest.
-3
+2

4.4

Modest changes in university rules regarding
intellectual property will allow commercial
activities to go forward without threatening
traditional values.

4.7

In expensive,

-2

+5

-2

+5

large-scale university-corporate

research partnerships, faculty should be
required to sign confidentiality statements in
which they agree not to disclose proprietary
information.
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4.8

4.10

4.15

Given industry's heavy investment in areas of
university research, I see nothing wrong with
submitting manuscripts to the company for
review prior to submission to a journal.

-4

+5

In order to protect worldwide commercialization
rights for new technologies, it's perfectly
acceptable for universities to ask their
scientists to delay publication of their research
findings to allow time for patents to be filed.

-2

+5

While commercial interests sometimes stand in
the way of full disclosure of scientific results,
this impediment is more than compensated for by
the infusion of additional funds which
accelerates research thus increases the amount
of scientific knowledge.

-2

+5

Discussion of Category 4 Statement Distribution
Both the Instrumentalist and Traditionalist schools subscribe to
the conviction that scientific custom and community depend on proper
communication.

Science is first and last an unrestricted dialogue or

"cross-fertilization of ideas"

(Mulkay,

1979).

In short,

the free

sharing of ideas entails an ethics balanced against certain threats and
risks.

The ultimate threat against scientific reciprocity (and the

generation of new ideas) being,

of course, non-circulation or secrecy.

The Traditionalist in particular abides no deviation from
altruistic norms.

It comes as somewhat of a surprise,

then,

that factor

A historians invest so little energy (excepting statement 4.8)
sensitive issue.

Perhaps,

this group of historians,

as found earlier,

into this

low scores indicate that

at any rate, work in an arena largely

unaffected by pressures to accommodate other interests.
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The card sorts

suggest that historians and polymer scientists work in distinct
contexts.
The polymer scientists'

enthusiastic endorsement of the

Instrumentalist values captured in these six statements possibly
reflects the special conditions of contemporary polymer research.

It

seems that factor B polymer scientists consider the ideal of open
research a contingent concept (4.4,

4.7,

4.8,

4.10,

4.15).

Perhaps this

reflects a utilitarian attitude marking an accommodation to get a job
done.

Such a pragmatic orientation would not be considered unusual in

technological sciences such as polymer science,
and engineering.

agriculture, medicine

Practices like submitting manuscripts for review by

sponsoring companies
patent filing (4.10),

(4.8),

delaying publication to allow time for

and signing confidentiality agreements

concern academic authority,

autonomy,

(4.7) also

and motivation - who and what is

the scientist working for (audience, motives),

and who determines

scientific merit and how is this judgment to be made?

Do these

"violations" of the cosmopolitan ethos of pure science confirm polymer
science as applied?

Under these circumstances,

applied science debate relevant any more?

is the pure science vs.

We are beginning to see how

social definitions of boundaries work.
Attention now turns to the remaining (miscellaneous)
which differentiate historians and polymer scientists.
are displayed in Table 5.13

(p.

95).
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statements

These statements

Table 5.13
Distribution of Miscellaneous Statements by Factor
(Factor A historians in parens)

Most Unlike
-5
-4

-3

-2

-1

0

+1

+2

+3

(5.4)

Most Like
+4
+5
5.4

(5.11)

5.11
6.2

(6.2)
(6.3)

6.3
(7.1)

7.1
9.7

(9.7)

Listing of Miscellaneous Statements with Factor Scores
5.4

5.11

6.2

6.3

7.1

9.7

Every university should be able to catalog the
expertise of its members and then market those
talents for fees or grants from corporations or
other clientele.

A

B

-3

+4

There's nothing inappropriate for academic sci¬
entists, while holding regular academic
appointments, to be proprietors, exclusively or
jointly, in private business firms in which
scientific knowledge gained in their academic
capacity is to be used.

0

+5

-2

+5

of tenure.

-4

+1

The legal safeguards built into large corporate
-university contracts plus procedural limits
established by the university are more than
adequate to protect the institutional autonomy
of the academic scientific community.

-3

It does not make any difference if the private
sector replaces or complements government as the
patron of science so long as the professional
reward system of academe is preserved.

Scores

All professors should be obliged to develop
revenue-generating projects as part of their
responsibility.
A professor's ability to
generate funds should be one of the conditions

Corporate sponsorship should be subject to peer
review.
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Discussion of Miscellaneous Statement Distribution
While the final six statements are too few to probe much beneath
the surface of any particular category (entrepreneurism,
career reward structure,
control,

9.7),

6.2,

6.3;

project design,

7.1;

5.4,

5.11;

and quality

they provide useful examples of the tensions dividing

Traditionalists and Instrumentalists.

For example,

statement 5.4 refers

to the overall social purpose of research universities.

The

Traditionalist asks whether faculty can realistically be academics and
businessmen at the same time without neglecting vital educational and
dialogic duties.

Statement 5.4 also hints of a (Traditionalist) concern

about the extension of the price-system into hitherto protected areas of
the university.

The commodification of knowledge that this purportedly

facilitates will see the university's traditional social forms
supplanted by economic instrumentality.
more enthusiasm than historians
contracts,

Polymer scientists manifest

(5.4 and 5.11);

after all, have built-in safeguards

for peer oversight of such agreements
Historians,

once again,

university-industry
(7.1) negating the need

(9.7).

are more difficult to read.

They reject

strategies to market university talent (5.4) but are completely
indifferent to university scientists commercially exploiting the fruit
of their academic research (5.11).
issue too remote.

Perhaps historians find this last

Not surprisingly,

perhaps, historians are clearly

unhappy with statement 6.3 and have less faith in good faith legal
arrangements with industry.

Perhaps these opposing reactions stem once

again from two different "takes" on these issues
cultural and moral;

- one

the other (polymer scientists)
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(historians)

legal.

This chapter closes with an analysis of those statements which
most sharply discriminate the composite points of view represented by
factors A and B.

Table 5.14
Distribution of Statements Most Sharply Discriminative
(cells -5, -4, and +5, +4) for Factor A (Historians)

Most Unlike
-4
-5
2. 6

-3

-2

-1

0

+1

+2

+3

3.9
4.8
6.3

Most Like
+4
+5
3.6
9.7

4.9
8.3
11.2

11.1

Listing of Negatively Scored Statements
2.6

Universities exist mainly to help industry turn knowledge into
technology, technology into productivity, and productivity into
profit.
Cell (-5)

3.9

Scientists who review other scientists' work for federal research
agencies or for scientific journals have no obligation to reveal
whether they have a financial stake in the research they are
reviewing.

(-4)

4.8

Given industry's heavy investment in some areas of university
research, I see nothing wrong with submitting manuscripts to the
company for review prior to submission to a journal. (-4)

6.3

All professors should be obliged to develop revenue-generating
projects as part of their responsibility.
A professor's ability
to generate funds should be one of the conditions of tenure. (-4)

11.1

Where large investments are involved,

companies should have the

right to review faculty appointments.

(-4)

Listing of Positively Scored Statements
4.9

A few heavily endowed industrial projects can distort the values
and mission of the university.
Industrial projects bring with
them a new kind of scientific culture that rewards marketable
research and protects proprietary information. (+5)
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8.3

Market forces have always been a part of the shifts among posts in
U.S. academia, but now the scale has dramatically altered their
significance.
These changes have created rifts within the
faculties of each institution; the humanities and social science
faculties often feel that they are being neglected. (+5)

11.2

The availability of industrial funding encourages hiring in
specific areas, which may not match education's long-term
priorities. (+5)

3.6

The pattern of collaboration between large universities and large
corporations may be a familiar one.
But the implications for the
use of taxpayers' funds and the danger of conflicts of interest
that these agreements raise require renewed evaluation. (+4)

9.7

Corporate sponsorship should be subject to peer review.

(+4)

Discussion of Discriminating Statements for Factor A
Many of these statements constitute familiar ground,

so there is

no need to perform a statement by statement analysis at this point.
Certain major themes need to be elaborated, however.

A survey of

statements makes clear that while factor A historians rarely slot
opinions at the extremes,

they are, nonetheless, consistent.

Negatively

scored statements are consistent and support positively scored ones and
vice versa.

Without exception, all of the statements shown above, on

either side of zero, represent Traditionalist values.

Positively scored

statements manifest a patent distrust of new corporate/university
partnerships.

Nothing good will come from the pursuit of such alliances

- a maldistribution of funds will raise interdisciplinary tensions
(8.3),

the conventional norms of scholarship will be undermined (4.9),

the university's long-term interests may become a victim of the
exigencies of the quarterly balance sheet (11.2), and such alliances
throw the public purpose of the university into question not to mention
that of faculty (3.5).

The implications of these new alliances need to

be reviewed by faculty (3.6, 9.7).

Negatively scored statements
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reinforce this anti-business orientation.
turn a profit.
entrepreneurs
together,

Universities do not exist to

Scholars run the risk of being recycled into
(6.3)

if not corporate employees

(4.8,

11.1).

Added

it is possible to detect a perception on the part of

historians that events are outpacing faculty obligations and control
(3.9,

4.8,

11.1,

4.9,

8.3).

Table 5.15
Distribution of Statements Most Sharply Discriminative
(cells -5, -4, and +5, +4) for Factor B (Polymer Scientists)

Most Unlike
-5
-4

-3

-2

-1

0

+1

+2

+3

11.1

Most Like
+4
+5
1.9
2.3
3.12
4.15
5.4
7.2

1.3
2.5
2.10
2.14
3.2
3.5
3.11
3.15
4.4
4.7
4.8
4.10
5.5
5.7
5.11

6.2
7.1
8.3

Listing of Positively Scored Statements
1.3 Universities are not charged to ensure the worldly success of
outside institutions, nor to uphold any values other than the
sharing and improvement of ideas.
Cell (+5)
2.5 The claims made by critics of university-industry ties exaggerate
the negative impacts and neglect the reciprocal benefits to both
institutions.

(+5)
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2.10

More industrial support induces wider scientific participation,
which in turn elevates the level of cross-collaboration,
which is
what ultimately moves science ahead. (+5)

2.14

A more applied orientation will be good for American university
science, reducing the academic isolation that developed during
earlier postwar
periods. (+5)

3.2

Limits should be placed on how much time faculty can devote to
outside concerns.
The one fifth rule allowing one day per week is
fair and adequate.
(+5)

3.5

Conflicts of interest can be minimized or avoided altogether by
vigilance and good faith.
(+5)

3.11

As long as I don't have controlling interest in a company, my
personal financial information is a private affair, irrelevant to
my research.
(+5)

3.15

It is not proper to use graduate students to work on research a
faculty member does for her firm.
(+5)

4.4

Modest changes in university rules regarding intellectual property
will allow commercial activities to go forward without threatening
traditional values.
(+5)

4.7

In expensive,
partnerships,
statements in
information.

4.8

Given industry's heavy investment in some areas of university
research, I see nothing wrong with submitting manuscripts to the
company for review prior to submission to a journal.
(+5)

4.10

In order to protect worldwide commercialization rights for new
technologies, it's perfectly acceptable for universities to ask
their scientists to delay publication of their research findings
to allow time for patents to be filed. (+5)

5.5

The social structure of science changes dramatically after
discoveries become inventions and researchers entrepreneurs.

large-scale university-corporate research
faculty should be required to sign confidentiality
which they agree not to disclose proprietary
(+5)

(+5)

5.7

If you make the ethics of academic science the same as Wall
Street, you're going to corrupt science.
(+5)

5.11

There's nothing inappropriate for academic scientists, while
holding regular academic appointments, to be proprietors,
exclusively or jointly, in private business firms in which
scientific knowledge gained in their academic capacity is to be
used.

(+5)
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6.2

It does not make any difference if the private sector replaces or
complements government as the patron of science as long as the
professional reward system of academe is preserved. (+5)

7.1

The legal safeguards built into large corporate-university
contracts plus procedural limits established by the university are
more than adequate to protect the institutional autonomy of the
academic scientific community.
(+5)

8.3

Market forces have always been a part of the shifts among posts in
U.S. academia, but now the scale has dramatically altered their
significance.
These changes have created rifts within the
faculties of each institution; the humanities and social science
faculties often feel that they are being neglected.
(+5)

1.9

I have some confidence that the bottom line of projects will keep
corporations from continuing to invest in activities that are not
good for them.
I have less confidence that academia has as clear
a yardstick
to judge the merits of various arrangements for its
own integrity.
(+4)

2.3

Continued links between the university and industry will
legitimate the university to interests outside the university on
the grounds of its contributions to the economic development of
society. (+4)

3.12

Universities should also be worried about "conflicts of
commitment" - situations where faculty members neglect their
academic duties in favor of pursuing
other activities, such as
consulting outside the university. (+4)

4.15

While commercial interests sometimes stand in the way of full
disclosure of scientific results, this impediment is more than
compensated for by the infusion of additional funds which
accelerates research and thus increases the amount of scientific
knowledge.

(+4)

5.4

Every university should be able to catalog the expertise of its
members and then market those talents for fees or grants from
corporations or other clientele. (+4)

7.2

With industrial support, there is relatively less freedom for the
researcher because there is now a single line to follow, the line
of the generous benefactor.

(+4)

Discussion of Discriminating Statements for Factor B
Obviously,

the polymer scientist/engineers have modeled a

composite Q-sort highly skewed at the positive extreme.5
statement (11.1)

is found at the negative
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Only one

("Most Unlike") extreme.

Not

much space will be devoted to 11.1 except to comment that its singular
location may represent the last straw for polymer scientists.
words,

In other

control over the appointment of colleagues is not to be shared

with business colleagues.

Perhaps statement 11.1 embodies a dimension

where even polymer scientists draw unambiguous lines:
11.1

Where large investments are involved, companies
should have the right to review faculty
appointments.

Again, because we have dealt earlier with virtually all of the
statements located in cells +4 and +5,
discussion.

However,

recognition.
8.3)

there is no need for detailed

some identifying polymer themes deserve special

For example,

eight (1.9,

3.12,

7.2,

1.3,

3.15,

5.5,

5.7,

or one third of the twenty-four statements in cells +4 and +5

validate Traditionalist values.

If the pattern of statement placement

in factor A suggests that historians are cool and consistent;

the

pattern in factor B favors an interpretation of polymer scientists as
enthusiastic but inconsistent.

How do we square,

Traditionalist statements typified by 1.9,

and 8.3?

strict

1.3 and 5.7 with the

utilitarian sentiments expressed in 2.3 and 5.4;
Instrumentalist statements 3.11 and 5.11;

for example,

or statement 3.12 with

or the opposition between 6.2

The fascinating thing is that this sample of polymer

scientists is apparently comfortable with this mix of apparently
irreconcilable values.
unlike historians,

Perhaps this indicates that polymer scientists,

function within at least two normative worlds?

Polymer scientists are consistently pragmatic concerning the
treatment of intellectual property;

that is,

it is conditionally free.

The ideal of open scientific communication notwithstanding,

all

circumstances are not the same

for example,

(4.4).
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There are instances,

where confidentiality (4.7),
competitive realities

contractual arrangements

(4.8) and

(4.10) have to be accounted for.

These exceptions

should not be construed as system threatening, however (3.2,
the whole,

On

the benefits of industry-university collaborations more than

compensate for any conceivable drawbacks
Moreover,

7.1).

(2.3,

2.5,

2.10,

4.15).

these arrangements are not qualitatively different from

government contracts
Besides,

it's past time for the university to emerge from its

self-isolation (2.3,
of interest)
In general,

(6.2).

2.14).

conflicts

they are properly dealt with at the individual level

(3.5).

the basic structure of the university and science continues

on as before.

In addition,

that one's professional
university)

When irregularities happen (e.g.,

the subjects in factor B adhere to the view

(inside the university)

and private

lives are separate and distinct (3.11,

5.11).

(outside the
Perhaps these

suppositions preview examples of the kind of rhetoric necessary for
coming to terms with the competing values above.

Summary and Discussion of Factor Results
Factor A Historians

- Closet Traditionalists?

Recall again the reason for employing a non-probabilistic
(qualitative)

subject sampling process.

Absent any documented

connection with the business community, historians were given the role
of Traditionalist control group ontological core.

i.e.,

At the same time,

the keepers of the university's

as full-members of a technological

science heavily reliant on industry support,

the polymer scientist

sample was deemed to represent a reasonable Instrumentalist proxy.
Hypothetically,

it was the polymer cohort's task to
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Q-sort the

academy's interactive frontier.

At the outset of this research,

in

other words, each faculty set was expected to more or less faithfully
rehearse the concentric schemas characterizing the

Traditionalist/

Instrumentalist and organizational literatures.
It turns out, however,

that both samples produced a mild surprise.

As expected, historians "correctly" confirmed the Traditionalist ethos
while rejecting Instrumentalist values.

This was illustrated in Table

5.5 (Distribution of Non-Economic and Economic Statements for Factor A).
But, overall,

these endorsements (unlike the Orwellian rhetoric featured

in the Traditionalist literature) were made with little evident
enthusiasm,

i.e.,

factor A historians placed very few Traditionalist

statements in the extreme cells.

This fact makes it difficult to

identify where this particular group of historians stands - their bottom
line, so to speak.
ink as we saw,

Historians do in fact draw some lines in indelible

for example,

Discriminatory Statements).

in Table 5.9 (Distribution of Factor
However,

the paucity of statements at the

extremes seems to signal a general lack of conviction.
The Traditionalist literature's xenophobic tendencies spring from
the conviction that the academy stands to lose far more than it gains in
partnership with industry.

For reasons that beg explanation at this

point, our historians appear content to cheer from the sidelines.
(Individual Q sorts provide a clue;

i.e., several historians placed high

numbers of card statements in the low value cells of -1, 0, +1.

This

seemed to parallel post-sort comments offered by some history faculty
that many of the statement issues were new or immaterial.)
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Instrumentalists - "Eating Your Cake and ..."?
Polymer scientist boundaries did not materialize as predicted
either.

For their part,

the sample of polymer scientists complicate

matters by demonstrating a propensity for eating their cake and having
it,

too.

Unlike Factor A historians, Factor B polymer subjects are

highly opinionated.

However, while the polymer card placements point to

an Instrumentalist bias, polymer opinion is virtually split between
Traditionalist (category 1 - Mertonian norms) and Instrumentalist
(category 2 - utilitarian norms) statements (see Table 5.6 - Distri¬
bution of Non-Economic and Economic Statements for Factor B).

We find

that polymer sorting results contain apparent contradictions.
The Mertonian prescription for open intellectual exchange is a
relevant case in point.

Our scientist sample categorically endorse the

Mertonian imperative of open intellectual exchange as shown in statement
1.3:
Universities are not charged to ensure the
worldly success of outside institutions, nor to
uphold any values other than the sharing and
improvement of ideas. X
Yet, within the same breath (sort) they proceed to interject a long list
of provisos such as those incorporated in statement 4.2; for example:
Some infringements of the university's principle
of free dissemination of information should be
allowed on a case be case basis in order to
protect the university's financial interest.
or 4.4:
Modest changes in university rules regarding
intellectual property will allow commercial
activities to go forward without threatening
traditional values.
(See also statements 4.7,
4.8, 4.10, and 4.15.)
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The roughly equal dispersion between themes from categories 1 and
2 appears to highlight an important work-related contradiction.
least in the case of our polymer scientist sample,

At

this and other

similar findings suggests a possible gap between abstract and practical
line drawing.
the academy.
both.

Polymer scientists coexist in two worlds - the market and
In the process,

they have learned how to accommodate to

"Reconciliations" typified in the oxymoron of "limited secrecy"

presented here (see also Etzkowitz, 1983, 1989) hint at the creative
nature of organizational boundary making.

Discussion
Factor A historians draw straight lines dividing acceptable norms
from unacceptable ones.

As expected,

their lines enclose the nuclear

academic ideals of the Mertonian catechism - disinterestedness,
openness, etc.
is obscured.

Yet,

their cartography is so faint that interpretation

Factor B scientists, on the other hand, seem to have

accommodated to two sets of contradictory lines, one Mertonian (espoused
theory?),

the other pragmatic (theory-in-use?)

(Argyris & Schon, 1978).

By comparison, because of the sectarian nature of the
Traditionalist/Instrumentalist discourse,

lines are never in doubt.

The

pure Traditionalist, as we have seen, espouses a closed logical text
predicated on a system of boundaries and inner constraints handed down
more or less intact from generation to generation.

Recognizable

boundaries are essential if academic society is not to lose its special
mission and character.

The pure Instrumentalist envisions a more open,

back-scratching arrangement with government and industry.

Instru¬

mentalist borders, consequently, resemble picket fences; nonetheless,
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university boundaries are still real, still locatable.

In step with

organizational theory, neither of these traditions doubt that boundaries
can be pinned down.
That our faculty findings fail to substantiate objective boundary
of any kind is key, however.

That is, by problematizing (blunting) the

taken-for-granted sharpness of conventional notions of demarcation,
faculty may have empirically revealed the pragmatic and therefore
continuous nature of organizational "boundary."

For historians,

appears that social boundary eludes straightforward definition.

it
Sorting

in undertones and soft hues, their definition of boundary remains
amorphous, undeclared.

By the same token, precise translation of

polymer scientist boundary is lost in self-contradiction.

Products of

the tension between principles and practice, polymer boundaries appear
improvised.

The diffuseness of these empirical findings echoes the

dynamic aspect of boundary typical of the interpretive literature.
more theoretical significance, however,

Of

this finding of incoherence

problematizes the ontological adequacy of the literature's regnant
nomenclature of enclosure.

End Notes
1.

In this case factor loadings equal to or in excess of 2.58 (SE) 0.32 are significant at the 0.01 level.
The standard error is
given by the expression SE - 1/7n where N - the number of
statements (1/766).
At minimum, a factor should demonstrate at
least two significant loadings or be excluded from further
mathematical analysis (see Brown, 1980, pp. 221-223 for more
detail).
In addition to the eight factor solution a factor analysis
forcing the extraction of only two factors was carried out.
Results were very similar to the "natural" eight factor solution
particularly in terms of how faculty from both departments were
aligned on the two major factors.
In the heuristic spirit of Q
Methodology, its was decided to focus on the natural occurring
factors A and B.
(The results of the two factor solution are
found in Appendix C.)
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2.

Statement Codes for Tables 5.3 & 5.4: 1. Universities as non¬
economic institutions (Strict Traditionalist); 2. Universities as
economic institutions (Strict Instrumentalist); 3.
Disinterestedness (academic autonomy/neutrality); 4. The social
relations of intellectual property; 5. Faculty entrepreneurism; 6.
Faculty reward structure - what gets recognized; 7. Who shapes the
design of work; 8. The Academy as collectivity; 9. Quality control
(peer review/how discovery is ratified); 10. the Organization of
work (departmental authority); 11. Criteria for faculty
recruitment and advancement.

3.

The lopsided number of statements in the +5 cell was somewhat of a
surprise because on average polymer subjects placed no more than
four cards in cell +5 (one subject placed seven statements in the
+5 cell).
Although perhaps unusual this asymmetric distribution
occurred in this case for two reasons.
One obvious explanation is
that these particular cards were sorted into the +5 cell with high
frequency.
But it must be recalled that all Q sorts are not
statistically equal.
Some Q sorts, that is, load more heavily and
therefore are closer approximations to a factor than others.
As a
result, they carry more "factor weight" (Brown, 1980).
In other
words, the unusual size of the +5 cell can be attributed largely
to the extraordinary pull exerted by the heavy factor weights of
high "loaders."

4.

Item scores were found to be significantly different
(statistically) between factors if they differed by two or more.
For example, if the factor array scores for an item were identical
or only apart by one, then the item scores the same for both
factors.
However, meaningfully different scores were considered
conservatively - to be a difference of four or more.
For
mathematical detail about how to statistically distinguish factor
scoring, see Brown, 1980, pp. 244-246.

5.

Factor weight is given as w = f/l-f2, where f represents the
factor loading and w the weight.
Weight derives from a subject's
factor loading which reflects the fact that some Q sorts are
closer approximations of a factor than others.
For example, the
factor weight (w) for female subject H12 is .867/1-.8672 or 3.47.
Whereas, Hll's factor weight works out to be only 0.91.
Hll's Q
sort, in other words, carries only (.91/3.47) or 26 percent of the
weight of H12's Q sort for calculating factor scores - the basis
for defining factor A's composite opinion.
(See Brown, 1980, pp.
241-242 for details.)
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CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS WITHOUT CONCLUSIONS

Categoriality is not simply another category,
all

categories,

i.e.,

Cognitive-affective,
interpretation
boundaries,
taking,

-

but

the ground for

that which renders categories possible.
real-symbolic,

objective-subjective,

explanation-

all such establish rigid and often arbitrary

encourage exaggerated oppositional

and impose intellectual barriers

thinking and sides-

to a more direct experiencing

of and feeling for the organism.

Each dichotomy therefore requires

systematic deconstruction before

the dialectic can proceed in

the

direction of a more fruitful synthesis.

Brown, 1989
In the logic,

if not the letter, of Burns and Stalker (1961),

this

research attempts to address whether organizational theory empirically
"fits" the reality it claims to explain.

In other words, does our

theorizing adequately represent organizations as they really are?
Accordingly,

insofar as organizational boundaries frame the way we think

about organizations, an attempt was made to empirically elucidate their
ontological substance.

Employing Q Methodology, select university

faculty sorted a set of statements relating to the social relations of
academic work.

The "insubstantiality" of organizational borders

elaborated in this study constitutes grounds for reflecting on the
discipline's unspoken presuppositions regarding the "coherence,
boundedness, and sharedness of cultural meaning systems" (Shore,

1991:

9).

Implications

The results of this study have potentially unsettling implications
for functionalist theorizing.

The question that this research raises

for the literature is this - given the interdependence of phenomena and
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organizations today, can organizational scholars continue to entertain a
notion of organizations as

"analytically distinctive social units"

(Georgiou, 1973) disconnected from the general societal culture
(Smircich, 1985; Calas & Smircich, 1987, 1988) and still claim
relevance?
That is, as organizational action escapes our attempts to contain
it, organizational analysis needs to shift from a near-exclusive
absorption with locating social structures on the "inside" and begin to
seriously address their elaboration within an interorganizational
context (the "outside")
1990).

(Pondy, 1977; Calas & McGuire,

1990; Clegg,

If conventional analytic dichotomies such as external/internal

or environment/organization (or Traditionalist/Instrumentalist)
represent prime examples of "misplaced concreteness"
infused with an empirical existence)

(products of logic

(Weick, 1977); and, moreover,

if

these binary categorizations are found to be increasingly out of touch
with a cosmopolitan empirical reality,
new focus of analytic concern (Weick,
Smircich & Stubbart,

1985; Turner,

then epistemology emerges as the
1976,

1990).

1977; Manning,
Analysis,

1979;

in short, properly

shifts to how analysts and practitioners draw their lines.
After all is said and done, Traditionalists and Instrumentalists
are both right and wrong at the same time.

The Instrumentalist

proposition that no sharp lines exist is a valid one - as far as it
goes.
point.

But the Instrumentalist,

I feel, misses the (Traditionalist)

I would like to suggest that the Traditionalist promotes the

preservation of an "ideal" university because, as these findings
suggest, there are no sharp edges.

That is, Traditionalists persist

precisely because borders are vague and dynamic extensions of "the
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incoherence of the academic structure"

(Veysey,

1965: 442).

For some at

least, ambiguity is a poor defense against the erosion of academic
independence and other signifying institutional values.
Let's take a moment to expand on the theoretical discussion
developed in Chapter 2.

Recall that we constructed an annulated model

of organization in which the organization literature was partitioned
into two concentric theoretical fields.

For example,

the model's

outermost zone was described as functioning as a theoretical cordon
sanitaire

dampening any environmental force with the potential to

overwhelm the organization's homologous identity.
systems and contingency theories,

Pioneered in open

this setting represents the permeable

negotiating arena where "fits" and equilibriums, subunit power,
bargaining and influence, power struggles,

loose coupling, new

organizational designs, etc.- are pretested and enacted.
We saw also that all energy emanates from the model's climate controlled command center (seen occupying the center of Figure 2.1).
This core space enshrines the Classical genre's invariable macro-logic
regarding managerial authority and organizational form (Graf,
Miller & O'Leary,

1989).

1979;

To maintain (i.e., to keep all other

expression out) and possibly extend and consolidate its security and
power (see Williamson,

1975),

the core relies on the aura of objective,

non-negotiable boundaries to deflect any potentially de-centering forces
that penetrate the perimeter (see Figure 6.1.).
Shown from above (management's perspective),

this concentric model

illustrates the literature's ambivalence regarding the substantivity of
organizational ontology.

Analogous to the Traditionalist/Instru-

mentalist discourse, organizational theory waffles between a faith in
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Figure 6.1.

The Ins(ides) and Outs(ides) of Organizational Theory

Topographical Schema
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the "real,"
(the core)

"substantive" constructs deployed by Classical theorists
and the negotiable versions qualifying more recent theorizing

(the borderlands).

Parthasarthy and Sethi's

(1992)

article typifies

this conceptual schizophrenia.
But from another angle we can see that not all ontology is equal.
If we carefully turn the model on its side, we obtain a better picture
of its distinctive ontological shape

(see Figure 6.2.).

In profile,

the

central core resembles a citadel granting those privileged enough to sit
at the top a commanding vista of the surrounding environment.
citadel's stony physicality embodies what is lasting,
Conversely,
i.e.,

good,

The

prototypic.

everything lying outside the citadel's implacable identity -

anything implying "impermanence,

(Astley & Zajac,
or pathology.

1991)

dissolvability,

and tacitness"

is routinely designated a dysfunctional anomaly

It is the hierarchic authority of this ontological

monument that is at stake here.

Boundaries,

as these schema indicate,

are not simply inert physical circumscriptions, but flexible constructs
that define
& Ingersoll,

"how things ought to be,

what is good and worthwhile"

(Adams

1990).

The Traditionalist literature cautions that the constitution of a
field of research as well as the content of inquiry and the treatment of
results
vacuum.

(distribution and validation)

"The management of science...has an ideological content,

insofar as science is in itself a
1988).

does not occur in a normative

'normative'

The more science is conceived as power

activity"

(Aronowitz,

prospect is enhanced that compromises will be struck,
proprietary concerns

(patents,

copyrights,
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(Aronowitz,

secrecy)

1988),

allowing

to co-opt a

the

Figure 6.2.

The Ontological Profile of the Organizational Literature
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university culture predicated in principle on open debate,

peer review

and publication.
Arguably,

the very structure of modern multi-universities made

resistance unlikely.

The specialization of curriculum and profes¬

sionalization of faculty, hierarchic authority,
compulsion"

(Bledstein,

1976;

Berry,

1985)

as well as a "commercial

to satisfy student/customers

in a competitive effort to meet enrollment quotas have allegedly denied
higher education any intellectual thematic coherence
Berry,

1985;

Graff,

1985).

(Bledstein,

1976;

The imperatives of career and speciality

served to isolate faculty and students leaving the operational
definition of universities in the hands of people most disposed to the
praxis of the bottom line,
Bledstein (1976)

i.e.,

the administration.

adds that "In every modern nation,

the

educational system has represented goals embedded within the
expectations of the culture"

(309).

That is,

the structural

arrangements between universities and their context to a large degree
frame their definitions.

Thus it happened that the occupational

relations and pragmatic impulses of the multi-university increasingly
corresponded with those operative in corporate culture.
the university experience came to stress means
("how to judge")
The
study,

industry,

("how to make")

over ends

1985).

"indeterminancy" of borders empirically elaborated in this

then,

citadel)

(Berry,

Like

opens the literature's core territorial assumptions

to transgression and interpretation.

"thingness"

(Weick,

1977)

If,

in other words,

the

of borders can no longer be sustained

unproblematically,

how is the Archimedian point of the management

science universe

the single-minded,

-

(the
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factual

"organization

-

to be

located?

Without firm boundaries,

longer knowable.
disorganized,

"insides" and "outsides" are no

And "organizations" and "environments" dissolve into

deterritorialized "nonplaces"

(Ashley,

1989).

The general

effect for theory is one of epistemic vertigo as we lose the ability to
"position ourselves within this space and cognitively map it"
& Jameson,

1988:

(Stepanson

7).

The broad scale redrawing of institutional borders apparently
underway today suggests that we reconsider interpretive grammar that
promotes organizations as sovereign and unified "centre(s)
calculation and classification"

(Clegg,

1990).

The literature has

acknowledged dimensionless artifacts like power,

technology,

(although it still endeavors to calibrate them).
theoretical issue is how to

of

and culture

Now the central

(re)think about organizations in a non¬

discrete world without slipping back into rationalistic and
functionalist

(i.e.,

territorialized)

thinking?

Perhaps a place to

begin this reconceptualization is with the question,
literature

in the

it so central?

"shape"

it's in?

Most importantly,

why is the

What does the core mean?

Why is

what is closed to discussion (the real

"outside") when theory is rooted in place(s)?
Organizations other than universities face comparable issues with
regard to "deterritorialization"
integrated manufacturing,
ecological events,

(Ashley & Walker,

Computer-

global electronic capital transfers,

the multi-(supra)national corporation,

represent examples of "placeless" action.
organizations

1990).

That is,

etc.

to think of

in the exclusivist imagery validated in neo-classical

theory (Perrow,

1986),

and/or in the narrow micro-trading emphasis of

transaction-costs economics

(Williamson,
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1975)

is to grossly over-

simplify the symbiotic tapestry of contemporary interorganizational
relations
theory,

(Calas & McGuire,

1990).

With or without the aid of formal

practitioners also need to contemplate the ecumenical

Bamardian)

(i.e.,

implications of these boundary transcendent phenomena.

Limitations
From an interpretive perspective,
only scratches the surface.

this cross-sectional analysis

There is the immediate business of

following up on the present research (Brown,
interpretations derived here,
subject faculties.

for example,

1980).

The

need to be verified with

In-depth interviews might help us learn more about

the reasons individual faculty and cohorts sorted as they did.
Other questions need to be explored.

Our findings indicate that

opinion divides along more than simply departmental lines.
example,
(1982)

do generation and gender,

How,

impact the sorting process?

for
Pfeffer

observes that academic gestalts are largely historical products

of where and when graduate training occurs.

An inter-

generational design might provide a needed baseline to assess the
penetration of market values over time.
Clearly,
depth.
sample

the opinions of women faculty need to be examined in more

The five female historians
-

-

the only women in the faculty

loaded virtually as a unit on Factor A.

Is it with female

faculty and other professional "minorities" where relatively pure,
sharp-edged "Traditionalist" academic boundaries are to be found?
In addition,

the size

(31)

research limits extrapolation.
demographic profiles,

of the faculty sample employed in this
Except for faculty with similar

we are not in a position to generalize about how
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other academic and non-academic administrative and research personnel
might factor.

We need to cast our net farther if we are to develop a

broader sense of the prevalence of marketplace thinking among different
university constituencies.
Given the continuing interest of policy makers in the
and content of Industry-university relations
1986,

1986a;

Assessment

(see Blumenthal,

[OTA]

therefore,

[1984]),

this study may be viewed as a preview as well
The sample used

should be expanded to include more "insiders" such as

faculty from a more diverse selection of disciplines,
university administrators;
and managers,

et al.,

and the survey sponsored by the Office of Technology

as a pretest for a more encompassing research effort.
here,

direction

students and

and "outsiders" such as industrial scientists

federal grant administrators and state legislators.

some 3600 colleges and universities in this country,
serious research schools

(Radin,

With

including 100

1991), not to mention industry,

there

is no shortage of sites to chose from.

Contributions
Regarding method,

this study suggests that Q can be an effective

mechanism for clarifying the elements shaping normative border disputes.
This largely stems from the proposition that Q provides a reliable means
to probe sensitive issues via the anonymity inherent in the statement
sorting process itself.

Thus,

Q offers a possible way around the self-

reporting bias diminishing the value of other approaches particularly
for red button items such as conflicts of interest or questions
concerning institutional goals and identity (see Krimsky,
Weissman

[1991]).

Q,

for example,

Ennis,

&

might have helped Brandeis faculty

117

and administrators to simplify the sometimes prickly "vortex of swirling
perceptions" unleashed during the university's recent quest to redefine
itself (Leatherman,

1990).

Other applications for boundary-oriented

research might include surveying physician opinion regarding the
rationing of health care or the effects of physician joint ventures and
other investment relationships with health care facilities.
Closer to home,

Q might also clarify aspects of the Internalist

(science is impervious to social context),

Externalist (science is

another social problem)

debate once preoccupying the

science

1982).

(Barnes & Edge,

sociology of

Perhaps subjectivist theory has eclipsed

Internalist theory in the minds of sociologists, but,
seem to suggest,

as our findings

Internalism may live on in the laboratory.

As in the

case of the border dispute between Traditionalists and Instrumentalists,
perhaps Q can aid us in developing a more nuanced understanding of how
scientists reconcile working contradictions between theory and practice
(Etzkowitz,

1983,

1989).

The value of this research is that it demonstrates the possibility
of studying process as it cognitively happens.

This is important for

theory and practice because the concept of continuity changes
everything.

Boundarylessness,

therefore,

description of a reconstituting reality.

is not just a metaphor but a
Questions of control,

heretofore so central to management and theory,
determines

-

are non-questions

-

illusory.

- who defines,

In the end,

who

the citadel is

actually a castle of sand because of the inverse relationship between
interdependence and control.

The real issue,

then,

is how do we

reconcile ourselves with the fact that boundarylessness has become the
norm?

How,

for example, will university officials compensate
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for recent

cancellations of state-supported economic-development research grants
made to universities as recently as the mid-1980s

(Blumenstyk,

1992)?

How do those in the role of theorists model "organizations" swept up in
the on-going process of interdependent reconfiguration?

119

APPENDIX A
SAMPLE SCORE SHEET FOR Q SORT

120

APPENDIX B
POPULATION (66) OF Q STATEMENTS BY TOPIC CATEGORY

122

SAMPLE SCORE SHEET FOR Q SORT

most

most
characteristic

uncharacteristic
-4

-3

-2

-1

♦2

0

■»3

(2)

+4

(2)
(3)

(3)
(A)

(M
(5)

(5)

(5)

Sample Respondent Demographics
Age _
Position:
Assistant, Associate, Full Professor
Years of full-time academic teaching and research _
Number of Publications _
Number of Conference Presentations _
Teach graduate students:
Yes/No.
Number of research grants from:
Government agencies _
Industry _
Foundations _
Other _
On the average, how many days a year do you devote to consulting for
industry and/or government? _
How many of the following do you hold:
Patents _
Copyrights _
Have you ever:
Planned or actually formed a business venture based on your research?
Yes/No.
Sat on any scientific advisory boards to industry?
Yes/No.
Actively explored integrating your professional work with an existing
company(ies)?
Yes/No.
Participated in any joint research projects with industry?
Yes/No.
Does your department have:
Staff from firms in private industry held non-salaried or salaried
faculty appointments?
Yes/No.
Staff from private industry offered courses for academic credit?
Yes/No.
Members of your department left the university to form their own
firms in order to commercialize the results of their research?
Yes/No.
On average, what percentage of the graduate students trained in your
department go on to take jobs in industry? _
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Population (66)

(1)

of Q Statements by Topic Category

Universities as Non-Economic Institutions

(Traditionalist)

(1:1)

Problem solving in service to industry is gradually eroding
the norm of discipline education and bringing the academic
in contact with groups outside the university who have
little regard for autonomous reason and ethics.

(1:2)

Close links between the university and industry are merely
the reflection within the research community of a broader
strategy adopted by U.S. capital, namely its effort to
tighten control over access to the results of scientific
research.

(1:3)

Universities are not charged to ensure the worldly success
of outside institutions, nor to uphold any values other than
the sharing and improvement or ideas.

(1:4)

As the university budget squeeze continues, it becomes
increasingly clear that the university cannot sustain both a
broad liberal arts curriculum that emphasizes teaching of
basic intellectual skills and values, and a commitment to
competitive advanced research with commercial profit.
Gradually the former is losing.

(1:5)

University officials maintain that they must pursue the path
of commercial research in order to support their educational
activities.
In reality, they are sacrificing those
educational activities in order to support their commercial
ventures.

(1:6)

The question for the '90s is whether universities are to be
public-sector institutions spending public money or
private-sector institutions supported with public money.

(1:7)

It's always a mistake to reduce support for fundamental
science in order to address things you think may have more
immediate applications.

(1:8)

Both university and corporate participants presume
incorrectly that their diverse interests can be easily
harmonized, and that problems can be easily worked out.

(1:9)

I have some confidence that the bottom line of projects will
keep corporations from continuing to invest in activities
that are not good for them.
I have less confidence that
academia has as clear a yardstick to judge the merits of
various arrangements for its own integrity.
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(1:10)

The university, heretofore viewed by business as a source of
training persons and expert advice, is now being looked at
as a factor of production.

(1:11)

Expensive, well-publicized corporate/university partnerships
are dangerous not only for the threats they pose to the
traditions of academic science, but because other
institutions will use these instances as "models" of the way
university-industry agreements ought to be.

(2)

Universities as Economic Institutions

(2:2)

The research university must assume a third function economic development - in addition to the traditional ones
of teaching and research.

(2:3)

Continued links between the university and industry will
legitimate the university to interests outside the
university on the grounds of its contributions to the
economic development of society.

(2:5)

The claims made by critics of university-industry ties
exaggerate the negative impacts and neglect the reciprocal
benefits to both institutions.

(2:6)

Universities exist mainly to help industry turn knowledge
into technology, technology into productivity, and
productivity into profit.

(2:9)

The scientific process is essentially self-correcting, and
more research money, not management, is all that is needed
to rectify abuses of the past.

(2:10)

More industrial support induces wider scientific
participation, which in turn elevates the level of
cross-collaboration, which is what ultimately moves science

('Instrumentalist')

ahead.
(2:11)

The effects of industry funding of universities are no
different from those of government funding.

(2:14)

A more applied orientation will be good for American
university
science, reducing the academic isolation that
developed during earlier postwar periods.

(3)

Disinterestedness

(3:2)

Limits should be placed on how much time faculty can devote
to outside concerns.
The one-fifth rule allowing one day

('Academic Autonomy)

per week is fair and adequate.
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(3:4)

Scientists who shift their attention to the economic
benefits of research or who hold equity in firms that market
scientific discoveries cannot, at the same time, serve
society as disinterested experts on the impacts of the new
scientific technologies.

(3:5)

Conflicts of interest can be minimized or avoided altogether
by vigilance and good faith.

(3:6)

The pattern of collaboration between large universities and
large corporations may be a familiar one.
But the
implications for the use of taxpayers' funds and the danger
of conflicts of interest that these agreements raise require
renewed evaluation.

(3:7)

Congress should press for public disclosure of faculty
members' extramural ties and for the release of the texts of
corporate-sponsored research agreements at universities.

(3:8)

Researchers should pledge that while a study is in progress,
they will not hold stock in the companies making or
distributing the products being evaluated.

(3:9)

Scientists who review other scientists' work for federal
research
agencies or for scientific journals have no
obligation to reveal whether they have a financial stake in
the research they are reviewing.

(3:10)

Universities are very much aware of complex issues like
conflict of interest involved in technology-transfer
activities and are dealing with them.

(3:11)

As long as I don't have controlling interest in a company,
my personal financial information is a private affair,
irrelevant to my research.

(3:12)

Universities should also be worried about "conflicts of
commitment" - situations where faculty members neglect their
academic duties in favor of pursuing other activities, such
as consulting outside the university.

(3:13)

The best way to handle the conflict of interest issue is for
the government to delegate oversight to individual
universities.
Each can then design policies best suited for
its faculty and mission.

(3:14)

It's a shame that the whole issue of disclosure and
divestiture is based on the assumption that financial
rewards affect a researcher's work.

(3:15)

It is not proper to use graduate students to work on
research a faculty member does for her firm.
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(3:16)

There is nothing improper with companies paying for trips to
scientific meetings and paying university scientists to talk
at those meetings about topics related to the company's
products.

(3:17)

Faculty ought not to teach in areas where their commercial
interests are direct and proprietary.

(4)

The Social Relations of Intellectual Property

(4:1)

The only "property rights" allowable for scientific
discoveries are the scientific honors and rewards that
derive from recognition of their originator.

(4:2)

Some infringements of the university's principle of free
dissemination of information should be allowed on a case by
case basis in order to protect the university's financial
interest.

(4:3)

The unwillingness of academic researchers supported by
industry to make research results public will slow the
research process of colleagues.

(4:4)

Modest changes in university rules regarding intellectual
property will allow commercial activities to go forward
without threatening traditional values.

(4:5)

Science is nourished by free and open exchanges of
information.
There is no place for proprietary knowledge in
the academy.

(4:6)

Free and open exchanges in science that threaten industrial
leadership are justifiably controlled.

(4:7)

In expensive, large-scale university-corporate research
partnerships, faculty should be required to sign
confidentiality statements in which they agree not to
disclose proprietary information.

(4:8)

Given industry's heavy investment in some areas of
university research, I see nothing wrong with submitting
manuscripts to the company for review prior to submission to
a j ournal.

(4:9)

A few heavily endowed industrial projects can distort the
values and mission of the university.
Industrial projects
bring with them a new kind of scientific culture that
rewards marketable research and protects proprietary
information.
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(4:10)

In order to protect worldwide commercialization rights for
new technologies, its perfectly acceptable for universities
to ask their scientists to delay publication of their
research findings to allow time for patents to be filed.

(4:15)

While commercial interests sometimes stand in the way of
full disclosure of scientific results, this impediment is
more than compensated for by the infusion of additional
funds which accelerates research and thus increases the
amount of scientific knowledge.

(5)

Faculty EntreDreneurism

(5:1)

The norms of science abjure scientists from becoming
directly involved in transforming their research results
into objects of monetary value.
Accordingly, academic
scientists who market their research are defined as deviant.

(5:4)

Every university should be able to catalog the expertise of
its members and then market those talents for fees or grants
from corporations or other clientele.

(5:5)

The social structure of science changes dramatically after
discoveries become inventions and researchers entrepreneurs.

(5:7)

If you make the ethics of academic science the same as Wall
Street, you're going to corrupt science.

(5:9)

Two classes are being created within the academic
profession: those who produce knowledge which can be made
the basis of business enterprises, and those who do not.

(5:11)

There's nothing inappropriate for academic scientists, while
holding regular academic appointments, to be proprietors,
exclusively or jointly, in private business firms in which
scientific knowledge gained in their academic capacity is to
be used.

(6)

Faculty Reward Structure

(6:2)

It does not make any difference if the private sector
replaces or complements government as the patron of science
as long as the professional reward system of academe is
preserved.

(6:3)

All professors should be obliged to develop revenue¬
generating projects as part of their responsibility.
A
professor's ability to generate funds should be one of the
conditions of tenure.
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(7)

The Design of Academic Work

(7:1)

The legal safeguards built into large corporate-university
contracts plus procedural limits established by the
university are more than adequate to protect the
institutional autonomy of the academic scientific community.

(7:2)

With industrial support, there is relatively less freedom
for the researcher because there is now a single line to
follow, the line of the generous benefactor.

(7:4)

Since industry rarely encourages fishing expeditions, the
more industry funds research the less U.S. universities will
nurture the capacity to innovate.

(8)

The Academy as Community

(8:3)

Market forces have always been a part of the shifts among
posts in U.S. academia, but now the scale has dramatically
altered their significance.
These changes have created
rifts within the faculties of each institution; the
humanities and social science faculties often feel that they
are being neglected.

(8:5)

There are bound to be adverse consequences in terms of
collaboration among faculty in various departments if one
group must worry about protecting corporate rights to
licenses.

(9)

Quality Control

(9:1)

Too much weight is given to the role of peer-reviewed
journals in the process of scientific communication.
Science doesn't not exist until it is published.

(9:3)

The peer review process is so slow and leaky is it any
wonder that university officials might prefer to hold a
press conference to announce the results of fast-breaking

(Peer Review)

research?
(9:5)

Given industry's investment in university research, it's not
surprising that industry should want to extend its control
into the "untouchable" area of peer review.

(9:7)

Corporate sponsorship should be subject to peer review.

(10)

The Organization of Academic Work (Department Structure)

(10:2)

Policy concerning university-industry relations should be
set and resolved at the department level.
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(10:5)

University-industry relations are so demanding that they
alter, in a substantive way, not only what it means to be an
academic researcher, but also the balance of the curriculum
offered by the university.

(ID

Criteria for Faculty Recruitment and Advancement

(11:1)

Where large investments are involved, companies should have
the right to review faculty appointments.

(11:2)

The availability of industrial funding encourages hiring in
specific areas, which may not match education's long-term
priorities.
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RESULTS OF FORCED TWO-FACTOR ANALYSIS
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Results of Forced Two-Factor Analysis

Factor A
Subj ects
P2
P9
P4
P12
P5
P17
P6
P10
PI
Pll
P3
P13
P16
P8
P15
P7
P14
H3
H7

Factor Loadings
.742
.732
.728
.726
.691
.689
.680
.657
.618
.608
.608
.604
.596
.593
.539
.510
.457
.432
.300

Factor B
Subjects
H12
H14
H4
H5
HI
H6
H9
H10
H2
Hll
H13
H8

Factor Loadings
.887
.832
.783
.778
.776
.772
.741
.661
.650
.633
.566
.482

131

APPENDIX D
FACTOR DEMOGRAPHICS
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Factor Demographics
Selected Demographics for Factor A Historians
Subject
H12
H14
HI
H5
H4
H6
H9
H2
H10
Hll

Factor Loading
.867
.854
.799
.791
.777
.768
.739
.636
.636
.592

Gender
F
F
F
F
F
M
M
M
M
M

The average Factor A historian subject is 45 years of age and has
13.4 years of teaching and research experience.
Five factor A subjects
are tenured.
The striking aspect about Factor A in addition to its all
historian cast is the relative location of female members.
The top five
loadings belong to women.
Owing to their high factor loadings, female
faculty exert the most influence in characterizing Factor A.1
The mean age for subjects in the polymer subject factor is 51
years.
All but one subject is tenured and all are male.
Teaching and
research experience duplicates that of factor A - 13.4 years.
Four
faculty own patents and three have been (or are) members of corporate
advisory panels.
Over half (54%) of this group's work is supported by
industry grants of various kinds.

Residual Factors
Residual factors in Q factor analysis often provide some
suggestive leads for subsequent research.
For example, factors C and E
may merit closer inspection due to their age differential.
Do they
suggest a possible correlation between generation and gestalt (see Kuhn,
1970; Mulkay, 1977; Richards, 1983; and Neustadt & May, 1986)?
Factor
Subj ect
PI
H7
P12
Factor E
Subj ect
P2
Pll
P3

C

(Mean age *=66)
Factor Loading
.720
.691
.652

Age
64
69
65

(Mean age *=36)
Factor Loading
.698
.670
.545
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Age
34
32
42

End Notes

1.

Factor weight is given as w - f/l-f, where f represents the factor
loading and w the weight.
Weight derives from a subject's factor
loading which reflects the fact that some Q sorts are closer
approximations of a factor than others.
For example, the factor
weight (w) for female subject H12 is .867/1-.867 or 3.47.
Whereas, Hll's factor weight works out to be only 0.91.
Hll's Q
sort, in other words, carries only (.91/3.47) or 26 percent of the
weight of H12's Q sort for calculating factor scores - the basis,
remember, for defining factor A's composite opinion.
(See Brown,
1980, pps. 241-242, for details.)
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